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Abstract 
EFFICIENCY OF UNIFIED VS. NON-UNIFIED STATE JUDICIARIES: AN 
EXAMINATION OF COURT ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
By: William E. Raftery 
Virginia Commonwealth University, December 2015 
Director: Dr. Robyn McDougle, Associate Professor, Public Policy and Administration, L. 
Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
 
State court systems function in much the same manner as any other government agency in terms 
of organization and management to utilize public resources in order to provide a public service. 
The question posed in the late 19th century was whether the courts should be organized and 
managed as they had been for centuries as local entities locally controlled and operated or 
transferred to the state level. The desired end was a more efficient use of public resources to 
achieve faster disposition of cases. This reorganization, called unification, was made up of three 
individual components: 1) consolidation required the reduction in the number of types of trial 
court in a state to one or two 2) centralization required the surrendering to the state's chief 
justice, later the newly created office of state court administrator, all managerial control over 
these courts, and 3) judicial rulemaking required removing from the legislature the power to 
create rules of practice and procedure in the courts, instead turning that power over to the courts 
themselves in the form of judicial councils or later state supreme courts. Unification, relying on 
principles of scientific management, served as the basis for state court reorganization for nearly a 
century, however the assumption that consolidation, centralization, and judicial rulemaking 
would lead to greater levels of efficiency in the courts remained effectively untested. Data for the 
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year 2013 was collected to measure state court efficiency in two ways: case clearance rates 
(number of cases disposed divided by the number of cases filed) and case clearance rates per 
judge (number of cases disposed divided by the number of judges). An ordinary least squares 
regression found no apparent relationship between a state's level of unification and its ability to 
clear its trial court caseloads. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Courts, like any other agencies of government, face restrictions on their resources. There 
are a finite number of dollars, hours, and employees to dedicate to a set number of problems or 
cases. Issues of logistics, organization, and administration apply to a court in many of the same 
ways they would any local department of government. Similar too are the same pressures to 
achieve efficient use of public resources. Unique to the courts, however, are two basic principles. 
First, courts operate in many respects like executive branch agencies, but they are not within the 
executive branch. They are a part of the judiciary which in the United States forms one of the 
three separate branches of government along with the executive and legislature. Second, where 
an individual department of local government can only date back decades or perhaps a century, 
some state courts can trace their origins to before the Revolution. Much as the executive branch 
would fragment into a myriad of departments a century later, state judiciaries in the 1700s were 
already being divided into a court for every different problem (divorce, petty crimes, felonies, 
probate), and for every different court, there were different judges and different laws to apply. 
There was little or no administrative oversight, no centralized system or means for prioritizing 
and tracking cases, no coordination among the various courts; indeed, no agreed upon approach 
for determining which courts handled which cases. Efficiency, whether defined in terms as 
government/public time and resources or defined as the time and resources of the individual 
parties to case, was an afterthought, if considered at all. The research found in the following 
pages attempts for the first time to systemically examine the level of efficiency related to state 
court systems using a particular framework, called unification, that was developed to address this 
lack of administrative oversight and centralization. 
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The adoption by early American lawyers and judges of the uncoordinated and haphazard 
court system taken from pre-Revolution England resulted in lengthy delays, duplication of 
efforts, and systemic waste.  Beginning in the late 1800s, advocates of judicial reform in both 
England and the U.S. sought to overhaul court administration. Under the banner of efficiency, 
very much in vogue at the time, reformers invoked concepts from scientific management and 
organization theory. Monetary, administrative, and logistics concerns were thought to be causing 
inefficiencies in the courts, but at that time no one new how to quantify inefficiency exactly, nor 
did they have so much as a theory of how to address this issue from in an administrative manner. 
Alternatives that focused on legal changes were considered. These included things such as 
speedy trial laws to mandate criminal cases be heard within a set number of days or the creation 
of codified laws such as New York’s “Field Code” that converted obscure common law writs 
and the distinction between law and equity into simpler to understand and access books of laws. 
These legal changes were deemed neither sufficient in and of themselves to fully address the 
challenges of inefficiency found in state courts nor were they helpful in quantifying the 
administrative challenges facing the courts. 
The first attempt at quantification and non-legal administrative restructuring became 
known as “unification” and used three separate but inter-related approaches or ideas. These were 
(Henderson et al, 1984): 
Consolidation of Courts All existing courts in a state should be consolidated into a 
single court. That court should be divided into two (a trial section + an appellate section) 
or three parts (a trial section for minor matters + a trial section for greater ones + an 
appellate section). 
Administrative Centralization All administrative authority over the court(s) created via 
consolidation should be vested in the office of the chief justice to be exercised by the 
chief justice or in conjunction with a judicial council. 
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Judicial Rulemaking All laws related to the practice and procedure used in the courts 
should be repealed and the power to establish such rules vested exclusively in the chief 
justice, supreme court, and/or judicial council. 
These three items were operationalized under this theory as 
Consolidation of Courts The number of trial court types in a state should equal 1 or 2. 
Administrative Centralization 100% of all trial court administrative operations and 
functions should be state controlled 
Judicial Rulemaking Yes or no: the power to create laws/rules related to the practice 
and procedure used in the courts is vested exclusively in the chief justice, supreme court, 
and/or judicial council 
Reformers claimed that as a state moved towards total consolidation, centralization, and judicial 
rulemaking it would see two specific benefits. 
Clearance Rate (Efficiency1) Defined as cases disposed divided by the number filed 
during a given time period (Ostrom, Kauder, & LaFountain, 2000). Unification advocates 
held delay would be reduced or end in state courts as the number of cases disposed 
exceeded the number of cases filed. 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑠
= Efficiency1 
Labor Productivity (Efficiency2) Hatry (1978) defined this with respect to public 
administration in general as the ratio of number of units of work accomplished per unit of 
input such as workers or labor hours.  Those advocating for unification defined “worker” 
as “judge” and believed the lack of waste of judicial resources would mean the number of 
cases disposed per judge would increase. 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡e 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
= Efficiency2 
 Unification seemed tailor made for judges and courts, which for centuries had applied 
concepts such as hierarchy (the decisions of higher court judges are binding on lower court 
judges), power and command (refusal to obey a court order could be punished by fines or 
imprisonment) and common law techniques for deciding cases, such as stare decisis (the 
importance of precedent), to achieve consistency and maintain control over their caseload. Yet 
state judges, legal communities, and legislators only slowly embraced unification; it would be 
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almost 30 years between the first official call for a unified court system (1909) and the official 
endorsement of the practice by the American Bar Association (1938).  
Despite slow adoption, the call for “efficiency” in courts pushed forward the ideas of 
unification for the last century.  Unification (the combination of centralization, consolidation, 
and judicial rulemaking) remains the recommendation of groups such as the American Bar 
Association and has gained favor once again as a way to control costs at a time of severe state 
budgetary constraints. For example amid the Great Recession New Hampshire (2011) and 
Vermont (2010) consolidated most of their courts and gave greater power to the state judiciary’s 
central authority (the administrative office of the courts) in the pursuit of saving money. Despite 
a century of pressing for unification, however, academic researchers have only rarely tried to 
measure systematically the effect of various unification efforts on case clearance rates while non-
academic research has focused almost exclusively on the cost savings associated with such 
efforts. However the original purpose and justification for unification were not as a cost savings 
effort, but was a focus on the disposition of cases. This leaves as an open question whether 
unification (and in particular the elements of consolidation and centralization) make a real 
difference in moving cases along in an orderly fashion. This thesis attempts to answer this 
important question. 
Statement of the Problem 
There is a problem in state courts concerning efficiency: are they using their limited 
resources in the best possible manner? Unification was offered as a way to achieve this 
efficiency. However, despite this policy being advanced as a solution to state courts for a century 
it is not clear whether states are more or less efficient than one another, making adoption of such 
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policies driven not by data or experience but on untested assumptions. Unification may or may 
not be impacting states, positively or negatively, but without a systematic examination of the 
subject there is no way of determining whether unification is an aid or hindrance for state courts. 
A study which investigates unification could remedy the situation, however with three limited 
exceptions (Dill, 1978; Bolling Swann, 1986; Rasmussen, 1998) there has been no effort to 
empirically demonstrate an association between efficiency and unification across states. A more 
structured, broader study is necessary in order to determine what if any benefits unification can 
offer states. 
Research Question 
Are unified state court systems more efficient than non-unified? 
Hypotheses 
Efficiency1 
H0 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, it has NO impact on the total 
clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, it has an impact on the total 
clearance rate 
 
H0 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, it has NO impact on the total 
clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, then it has an impact on the 
total clearance rate 
 
Efficiency2 
H0 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, then it has NO impact on the 
per judge clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, then it has an impact on the 
per judge clearance rate 
 
H0 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, then it has NO impact per judge 
clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, then it has an impact per judge 
clearance rate 
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Purpose of the Study 
The research question has been and is important to the fields of public administration, 
judicial administration, court management, and the legal profession. From the public 
administration perspective, the well organized and well managed judiciary can deliver services 
optimally and with as little cost to the taxpayer as possible. (Chaston, 2011) For judicial 
administration, efficient operations mean little to no loss of legal talent, time, and fiscal 
resources. (National Center for State Courts, 2011) It means that the courts as a whole are able to 
operate uniformly and consistently throughout the state. From a court management perspective 
this means potentially greater opportunities to share and pool local resources between and among 
courts and more flexibility in terms of access to other courts and their talents. For the legal 
profession this has been a focus of attention to one degree or another for over a century and 
continues to be an issue for those who practice within the courts. 
Limitations 
The study focused exclusively on the individual state judiciary’s ability to dispose of the 
cases brought before it without regard for other aspects. It did not contend with issues related to 
the quality of justice rendered, the outcome of cases, or questions related thereto. Moreover, the 
data focused at the state level and did not consider the performance of individual judges or 
courts. Local variations down to the municipal/town level were not considered in this research. 
Finally, and most critically, was the lack of data from most state court systems at the state level. 
Despite a century of efforts to measure the work of courts, only 24 states can provide an accurate 
report on how many cases were filed and disposed in any given year that is consistent with how 
other states report such data. This is the result of state court systems that either cannot, or in 
some instances will not, provide information related to incoming and outgoing caseloads. The 
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state of Oklahoma, for example, reported such data until 1997 at which point administrative 
leadership in the state’s judiciary refused to release any trial court filing or disposition data for 
over a decade. (Court Statistics Project, National Center for State Courts, 2006) Because the data 
collected was on a voluntary basis, response rates were not 100%.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review – The Organization and Efficiency of Courts  
Introduction  
Much of the study of the organization and efficiency of courts has been in the area of law, 
with concepts borrowed from the literature of management and organization in general and 
public administration in particular. The authors and practitioners were more often than not law-
trained, however they relied on the same precepts as their public management counterparts in the 
early 1900s and their reliance on classic organizational theories. Unification, the term developed 
in these legal communities, is effectively a reformulation of scientific management. This chapter 
then examines the development of the literature in this era, noting the similarities between the 
legal and public administrative writings. It concludes with an examination of later specific efforts 
to both define and to a limited degree measure unification in public administrative works.  
Before unification: “chaotic localism” 
The desire in the late 1800s and early 1900s for “unified” state judiciaries intertwined 
three elements that focused on the organization (consolidation), administration (centralization), 
and legal authority over rules of practice and procedures (judicial rulemaking). The first two in 
particular were notably intertwined because of their direct linkages to the literature of the 
Progressive Era and its emphasis on organizational and administrative restructuring. They were 
also in direct contrast with the practices that had been in place in the Anglo-American legal 
system for over 600 years. 
The organizational. From the colonial era into the 1900s state courts were structured in 
much the same manner as in England since the reign of Edward I in the late 1200s. (Pound, 
1940) Each different type or sort of case was to be given its own court, with its own judges, and 
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with nebulous and often overlapping jurisdiction. In writing on the condition in England in 1817, 
Sir Edward Coke identified no fewer than 74 different courts in England with judges serving on 
multiple courts individually or collectively. Parliament and the Crown through the Great Council 
retained and exercised separate judicial authorities as well. States replicated this practice, with a 
multitude of court types in each state ranging from those based on case type (civil, criminal, law, 
equity, admiralty, probate, etc.) and geography (larger cities would have their own separate trial 
court systems). Legislatures and governors were also invested with judicial authority, able to 
issue writs, grant divorces, and sit as appellate courts. Atop this organization called the judicial 
branch sat, effectively, a jumble. State courts of last resort were often made up of judges from 
the lower courts sitting collectively or with some combination of the legislature and/or executive 
branch. Clarity in terms of organizational structure was almost entirely lacking. 
England moved towards a consolidation of the system established by Edward through a 
series of acts from 1873 through 1899 known collectively as the Judicature Acts. (Taylor H. , 
1898) The result was the consolidation of seven courts into one, with a single set of rules for 
pleading and procedure. The House of Lords effectively abandoned its role as court of last resort. 
By the time the 12th and final of the Judicature Acts was adopted in 1899, the judicial system 
established by Edward I and in place for 600+ years effectively had been replaced. As England 
was moving to change radically the system it had in place, U.S. states were continuing apace, 
either retaining or expanding the same practices England had just abandoned. Pound (1940) 
notes in the time between the Civil War and 1900 “nothing striking was evolved in the state 
states as to these [trial courts]...” Simeon Baldwin (1905) writing contemporaneously reviewed 
the state court systems of the time and found their structures to be a litany of complexity in terms 
of their organization. 
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The administrative. The Judicature Acts also revised the administration of the English 
judiciary in what was described as a “revolutionary” way. (Martin & Law, 2009) Under the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1881 powers held directly by the Crown over the 
administration of the courts were transferred down to the Lord Chief Justice of England. 
Additionally administrative powers over the lower courts, such as times of holding court, hiring 
or appointment of court staff, and direction of clerks, was transferred up from the lower courts to 
the Lord Chief Justice. Where lower courts retained such powers their exercise was subject to the 
Lord Chief Justice who could change them at will. Under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 
1883 most of the judiciary’s finances were transferred to a newly created Consolidated Fund 
under the control of the Lord Chancellor. The office of Lord Chancellor itself was revised and 
expanded in terms of its existing responsibilities as administrator of the courts, clerk, and 
nominal judge. (Andrews & Stoney, 1883) Meanwhile, state courts in the U.S. were the very 
definition of “chaotic localism”, (Golembiewski, 1977) a system so decentralized that the 
conditions on the ground at one particular place at one particular time are the only ones that 
matter. In the California of the 1910s, “the result has been to produce a system of judicial 
administration, in which local conditions exercise the maximum of influence. Localized 
administration makes for localized law.” (McMurray, 1917). 
The Progressive era & Classical Organizational Theory 
Occurring at roughly the same time as the general interest in reformulating the 
administration and organization of U.S. state courts was the advent of the Progressive Era, with 
its focus on “centralization, order, and expertise.” (Levine, 2000) Central to this were two related 
concepts: scientific management which focused on the management of work and workers and 
administrative management or classical organization theory which addressed issues concerning 
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how overall organization should be structured. (Lunenburg & Ornstein, 2007) Together scientific 
management and administrative management have come to be known as classical management. 
(Griffin, 1987) 
Scientific management/Taylorism The advent of large scale manufacturing and 
industrial development in the late 1800s brought with it a greater differentiation between 
management and labor. The examination of the interplay between the two, as well as the work 
itself, formed the basis for scientific management. The “science” in the management was through 
measurement, mostly focused on inputs (number of work hours) and outputs (number of items 
produced). Taylorism, named after one scientific management’s leading proponents Frederick 
Taylor, relied upon several assumptions not the least of which were inputs can be converted to 
outputs in a mechanistic fashion and that outputs are measurable. (Chapman, 2003) This led to 
the need for standardization in terms of measurement. It also led, in many cases, to productivity 
increases as a greater focus was made on determining what was working and what wasn’t in a 
much more systematic way. Good management, for Taylor, meant high wages and low unit 
production costs, without the burden on the worker of worry over planning, organizing, 
controlling, and determining methods. (George, 1972)  
Scientific management formed the heart of court unification efforts. Pound (1940) 
bemoaned that “[S]cientific management is needed in a modem court no less than in a modern 
factory.” As late as the 1970s scientific management techniques were drawing praise from 
unification proponents. A systems analyst with the Minnesota Supreme Court rhetorically asked 
“Can scientific management techniques appropriately be applied in a court setting?... [T]he 
answer is yes.” (Good, 1980) 
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Henri Fayol If Taylor’s focus was on the individual worker, Fayol’s was on the larger 
picture. Starting in 1916 with Administration industrielle et generale (General and Industrial 
Management) Fayol provided a template for organization that focused on five key managerial 
functions: planning, organization, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. These were 
further supplemented with Principles of Management (Fayol, [1916] 2005). The publication 
focused on unity and hierarchy of command and direction and centralization. Although not 
identified directly in the literature of court unification, his concepts would be replicated; unity of 
command and unity of direction in particular played a role in the hierarchical nature of court 
unification efforts. (Hays & Douglas, 2007) W.F. Willoughby (1929) made unity of command 
and unity of direction the centerpieces of his vision of judicial administration. 
Administrative Management/Departmentalism Whereas the concern of Scientific 
Management was on finding the “one best way” of performing a task, Administrative 
Management (Mosher, 1968) or Departmentalism (March & Simon, 1958) concentrated on the 
formal institutional structure of organizations. Both contended there was a science and 
preordained general precepts to management that could be deduced and universally applied, 
rather than reliance on inductively derived concepts from a myriad of specific observations. (Fry 
& Raadscheiders, 2008) Luther Gulick and his cohorts focused on the organizational chart as the 
level of analysis with heavy reliance on hierarchy as the primary mechanism for control and 
coordination. (Fry & Raadscheiders, 2008) Finally, Max Weber’s contributions with respect to 
the notion of bureaucracy should be noted, but with a caveat. While his work would greatly 
contribute to the ideas of the Classical school of organization, they likely occurred after World 
War II when his works began to be translated and distributed to the English speaking world. (Fry 
& Raadscheiders, 2008) 
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Weber There are several contributions Max Weber made to “classical” organizational 
theory, but two stand out especially with respect to court unification and are specifically 
mentioned in its literature. (Gallas, 1976) The first was Weber’s essay on Bureaucracy (1915) 
which laid out the ideal organization’s characteristics: 
1. There are to be fixed and official jurisdictional areas, ordered by laws and rules 
2. There is an office hierarchy and levels of graded authority based on subordination 
3. All management is based on writing documents that are to be preserved and drawn from 
4. Office management presupposes thorough and expert training 
5. The primary or sole responsibility of the officeholder is to fulfill the functions of that 
office 
6. The rules pertaining to the management of the office are to be stable, exhaustive, and 
learnable 
Many of these elements would appear in the context of unification. Having fixed and official 
jurisdictional areas for courts and their judges is effectively an extension of the first in Weber’s 
list. A hierarchy starting with the state’s chief justice down to the lowliest file clerk would 
provide structure and command. Focusing on the management of the branch/agency would give 
the chief justice and subordinates a dynamic on which to base their productivity and function.  
The second, per Gallas (1976) was Weber’s The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization (1947). There Weber put forth three mechanisms for authority: 
 charismatic authority relied on based on the sacred or some characteristic of the 
individual 
 tradition authority relied on rote and custom 
 rational legal authority relied upon code or set of rules 
Each of the three had effectively been developed and tested but Weber argued it was rational 
legal authority that had the greatest potential to harness the modern world via bureaucracy. This 
in turn relied on the acceptance of the assumptions that 
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1. Law based on reason can be established by agreement or imposition upon on all those in 
the sphere of authority. 
2. Law is a system of abstract rules which are applied to particular cases; administration 
looks after the interests of the organization within the limits of that law generally. 
3. That the imposition and administration of the law or legal norm by the office holder is 
impersonal and relies solely on the legal obligations and authorities in question. 
4. The person who obeys does so as a result of their status in the organization and not based 
upon their personal status. 
5. Adherence to orders and directives issued under criteria 3 are based upon an obligation to 
adhere to the lawfulness of the order and not the order-giver’s personal status or other 
characteristic. 
Labor and administrative leadership within this construct was to be defined and divided 
based on specialization, a defined “sphere of competence” within which the administrator was to 
be deemed inviolate in the (lawful) carrying out of their duties. There was to be a consistent 
organization of supervision based on distinctive levels of authority. Officials in their respective 
roles were to be full-time paid officials assigned only to the task at hand. Careerism was favored 
and promotion based on seniority and merit encouraged. There was to be a particular line 
between private and public life and the finances and interests of the two. Key to the bureaucratic 
state too was the idea of “technical knowledge”; Weber used the term or a version of it dozens of 
times and in particular as a wedge against office holders who were placed their due to personal 
obedience (the monarchial model) as well as encroachment from outside the particular “sphere of 
competence” by others in related fields or authorities. Corwin (1965, 1970) found later that this 
could be carried to the extreme that professional persons in public organizations will demand 
control over their sphere of influence in “a militant process” seeking “militant professionalism.” 
Courts would later find this distinction difficult as judges were unwilling or unable to surrender 
their administrative authority as they viewed it as part and parcel of the adjudicative authority. 
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Gulick The President's Committee on Administrative Management, better known as the 
Brownlow Committee or Brownlow Commission was created in 1937 to recommend an overhaul 
of the entire executive branch of the U.S. federal government. The three member committee was 
chaired by Louis Brownlow and included Charles Merriam and Luther Gulick. It was Gulick’s 
December 1936 memo and its June 1937 revision (Gulick, 1937) that advanced the case for what 
would later be called the managerial presidency. (Brodie, 1989) For Guilck, the ideal 
government is one in which the chief executive, supported by a special staff, draws the plans; the 
legislature accepts or rejects proposed policies; the executive carries out the adopted plan; and 
the public exercises general control through participation in political parties and pressure groups. 
Much of Gulick’s work, reduced down to the acronym POSDCORB, is effectively a 
recitation of Fayol’s and Taylor’s prior work; indeed Gulick’s main collaborator and co-author 
Lyndall Urwick (1937) acknowledged as much. POSDCORB stood for Planning, Organization, 
Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting. Gulick placed a “particular stress on 
structural reform in the name of consolidation and integration, centralization to enhance 
executive power, professionalization to improve the quality of personnel in the public sector, and 
the rationalization of decision-making and management processes to assure greater effectiveness 
and efficiency in service delivery.” (Fry and Raadschelders, 2008) These were the very same 
terms being used as part of court unification efforts at the time. Gulick viewed the essential 
problem of management as creating, controlling, and coordinating labor through a division of 
functions (Denhardt & Baker, 2007). Gulick (1937) required formal definitions and divisions of 
work, strict and structured bureaucratic relationships, professional staffs, and rational activities. 
Administration would be integrated under strong executives, and coordinated under a chief 
executive with a view of the entire process. POSDCORB would become precisely the template 
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those in favor of court unification would use for their vision of the office of chief justice of a 
unified court system (centralization). 
Unification: Consolidation, Centralization, Judicial Rulemaking 
As the above demonstrates the push for unification started as an effort to emulate the 
successes in England and combined the language of scientific management with classic 
organizational theory. All three relied heavily on notions of hierarchical control, simplicity, and 
creation of rules of processes. In the context of unification these would manifest as 
centralization, consolidation, and judicial rulemaking. 
Consolidation. At least as far back as 1896 the American Bar Association began 
advocating for an organizational solution to the problems plaguing the state court systems such 
as adopting the English Judicature Act reforms to consolidate the courts as much as possible. 
(Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law, 1896) A decade later 
in a keynote speech to the ABA entitled “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice”, Roscoe Pound inveighed against “our American judicial 
organization”, warned against the multiplicity of courts with concurrent jurisdictions, and the 
attending waste of judicial resources. In response to Pound’s 1906 speech, the ABA appointed in 
1907 a Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay 
and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation. 
By 1909 that committee reported out its proposal that at least for civil matters all courts 
should be reorganized and consolidated within a state into One Court of Justice. Pound (1940) 
would later note the limitation for “civil matters” only was as a hedge to the possibility of there 
being a separate and identical court system for criminal matters. Anticipating criticism that 
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consolidation would mean local concerns would be trumped, the committee noted that the 
localities were already ill-served by current conditions. The report concludes with 9 separate 
rationales for the need for restructuring, several of which addressed organization directly 
 States do not effectively have a judicial branch; they have a collection of courts. 
Collective action makes for a branch, and a strong one. (#1) 
 Elimination of waste “of judicial power” caused by rigid organizational lines (#2) 
 Elimination of conflicts between judges over who is supposed to be hearing a case and 
when, and gives parties and courts stability in handling their cases. (#7) 
The 1909 special committee report was never formally adopted by the ABA House of 
Delegates; while other elements of the report related to legal matters were approved, it would be 
another four decades before the concept of unification became their official policy. That said the 
1909 Special Committee report was subsequently identified by the American Judicature Society 
(1917) as the place and time where “the conception of the unified state court system first 
received adequate expression.”  
Running parallel to the push for state court consolidation was a push for federal court 
consolidation. Since the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789 there had been effectively two 
federal trial courts (District and Circuit), however both had overlapping jurisdictions and 
authorities and were often presided over by the same judge. (Federal Judicial Center, 2013) By 
1911 former President and then Chief Justice William Howard Taft had asked and obtained from 
Congress the dissolution of the Circuit Courts and the transfer of all cases into the District 
Courts. It was this initial success that prompted Pound and others to press for the same in the 
state judiciaries. 
Pound moved quickly after the rejection of the 1909 report to engage the business 
community in the cause of unification. The Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the 
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Administration of Justice (1914) published by the National Economic League at Pound’s request 
made a business case for consolidation, especially in urban areas where larger corporations were 
based. The result was the formal support for consolidation by some of the largest corporations of 
the time. 
Where consolidation and unification in the U.S. began as an idea coming out of the ABA, 
it was the American Judicature Society founded in 1913 that put the concept into specific legal 
and constitutional language. Bulletin VII, released in 1914, was a draft set of constitutional 
language that specified consolidation; the final version published in 1917 as Bulletin VII-A 
remains the basis for all court consolidation in the U.S. to this day. Under it, the entire state’s 
judiciary, including every court and all judicial power and authority, were to be absorbed into a 
newly created “General Court of Judicature.” In lieu of a multitude of trial courts there were to 
be only two: a permanent lower court (County Court) to hear petty crimes and small civil cases 
and a permanent higher court (Superior Court) to hear all major crimes and civil matters. There 
would be a single appellate court (Court of Appeal) that would take over from existing state 
supreme courts. The first provision, before all other activities in creating the General Court of 
Judicature, would be the constitutional consolidation of all existing courts and judges. 
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Consolidation was by every measure and writer the prerequisite for unification; W.F. 
Willoughby’s Principles of Judicial Administration (1929) dedicated an entire section to Judicial 
Organization and provided the organizational arguments for consolidation, as the American 
Judicature Society acknowledged in reviewing the book. (1930) In detailing the 
questions/problems challenging the state judiciaries, Willoughby acknowledged the lack of 
consolidation almost immediately (“Problem of organization: should there be a single court with 
subdivisions to handle cases?”) Willoughby argued organizational consolidation is “the most 
important” improvement that can be made and that this alone would help eliminate “confusion, 
duplication, overlapping of organization and functions, conflicts of jurisdiction, unnecessary 
cost, etc.” Willoughby came out forcefully for divisional specialization rather than court-type 
specialization so as to increase technical prowess. Where there were courts with multiple judges, 
Figure 1 Bulletin VII-A: Diagram Showing Unified State Court (1917) 
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the chief justice was advised to see to it certain case types were assigned to particular judges. 
The desire was for specialized judges, not specialized courts. 
The American Bar Association, after 3 decades of pressure, finally adopted as a formal 
policy court consolidation in its Standards of Judicial Administration, developed under the 
direction of ABA President Arthur T. Vanderbilt and released in 1938. The ABA Committee on 
Judicial Administration along with other committees each submitted its recommendations for 
Standards and the resulting report approved by the House of Delegates. (reprtined in Vanderbilt, 
1949) States were expected to have “a unified judicial system comprising all the courts within a 
state.” The Standards specified either a single tier trial court or a two tier system such as the one 
found in Bulletin VII-A. Pound in his Organization of Courts (1940) would eventually be 
persuaded that having two trial courts would be preferable, with lesser matters sent to the lower 
courts. Today there are effectively 13 states with the sort of consolidation advocated for under 
the model of unification, two of which (New Hampshire and Vermont) consolidated within the 
last 3 years. 
Table 1 State Court Structure Models 
AJS/Willoughby (generally) 
Willoughby (large 
municipalities) 
Pound 
Supreme Court Division Supreme Court Division Supreme Court 
3 judges panels (as needed) 3 judges panels (as needed) 
Court of Appeals 
(permanent) 
Superior Court Division 
Metropolitan Division 
Superior Court 
County Court Division County Court 
Centralization. More controversial that organizational restructuring was the idea of the 
locally elected independent judges and clerks being subject to control by another entity, even if 
that entity was within the judicial branch. This was the process of centralization, the 
bureaucratic, hierarchical control function advocated for by the Classical Organizational 
21 
 
theorists. The first instance of such a call was the 1909 ABA Special Committee report discussed 
previously. The powers to be held by the “high official” of the consolidated court were 
expansive: “Supervision of the business administration of the whole court should be committed 
to some one high official of the court who would be responsible for failure to utilize the judicial 
power of the state effectively… it should be his duty to see to it that the energies of the judicial 
department are employed fully and efficiently upon all business in hand.” 
The report also pressed for handing administrative control over not just judges, but the 
entirety of the clerical staff to this “high official.” As the report noted, it was entirely common 
for the clerks of court, even for the state supreme courts, to be independently elected. “No one is 
charged with supervision of this important branch of the judicial system…Better supervision and 
control of the administrative officers connected with judicial administration… make[s] it 
possible to introduce improved and more business-like methods in the making of judicial records 
and the clerical work of the courts.” 
The 1909 ABA Special Committee report left it vague as to who would be the “high 
official of the court” to exercise this power, reflecting at the time the concern that no judge 
would want the job and that it was perhaps best exercised by someone in the executive branch. 
There was precedent for this notion at the federal level. The U.S. Attorney General effectively 
operated as the chief administrator in the federal judiciary since at least 1870, including retaining 
funds for the courts, disbursement, and accounting. The Attorney General personally or through 
subordinates was able to reassign judges from district to district or circuit to circuit. (Fish, 1973) 
In 1927 one Department of Justice spokesperson noted that standardization, administration, and 
professionalization of the federal courts meant the centralization of power away from local 
courts, that a “central authority” had to weave the threads of budget, appointment, personnel, and 
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standards. “Somebody has to be the spider” to weave all these threads, he said, and that spider 
had to be the Department of Justice. (Fish, 1973). 
This was the state of things when the American Judicature Society began to examine this 
issue between 1914 and 1917. Several members of the Society advocated for centralization of 
administrative control outside the branch in a manner similar to that which was happening at the 
federal level. The leadership of AJS rejected such a plan. “It is important that there shall not be a 
divided headship…To deprive such Chief Justice of the administrative headship and give it to 
one who was outside the counsels of the court in its daily work of deciding cases, would be to 
introduce an element of confusion and lack of co-operation.” 
The Society went further, arguing the Chief Justice’s “first duty” would be to see to it 
that the entire General Court of Judicature ran smoothly. To this end the Chief Justice was to be 
given broad administrative powers. Judges would be assigned to a particular court or district at 
the direction of the Chief Justice. Bulletin VII-A also recommended that judges should cease to 
be elected or appointed from outside the branch and instead appointed by the chief justice and 
removable on accusations of administrative failure such as failure to complete cases in a timely 
fashion. 
Willoughby in 1929 similarly advocated for a strong chief justice with “large powers of 
general direction, supervision, and control over the entire work of the court”, those powers many 
of which would find their way later into reports, in particular State Court Organization. 
 classifying the several divisions of the court 
 assigning to these divisions the judges attached to the court, with a view to the most 
effective utilization of their special attainments and the advantages resulting from 
specialization 
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 controlling assignments to the several divisions, with a view to equalizing the burden of 
work and making the fullest use of judicial personnel 
 formulating the rules of procedure, so as to secure uniformity in respect to the manner of 
conducting the business of the court 
 prescribing the character of records to be maintained 
 requiring periodical reports on the work performed and the condition of business 
 generally exercising those powers that will that will ensure a standardization of practice 
and efficiency in the conduct of affairs 
Willoughby took pains to note that these changes were to extend to “purely 
administrative affairs...in no way interfering with the exercise of judicial discretion.”  In the 
context of the judiciary with its emphasis on precedent and vertical stare decisis (the ruling of a 
higher court is binding on all lower courts) one might assume that acknowledgement of higher 
authority in the administrative arena would be a given. However, this was not necessarily so; 
Willoughby warned that it would prove hard to convince judges and clerks of court to accept 
interference in what they viewed as their exclusive domain. 
Willoughby also anticipated criticism that centralization of administrative power over the 
branch in the hands of the chief justice would lead to centralization of the adjudicative power 
there as well, Willoughby wanted a “general manager in respect to the internal organization, and 
purely administrative features of the work of the court” or as he put it later the “business 
administration of courts.” Later both the American Bar Association in its 1938 Standards of 
Judicial Administration and Pound in Organization of Courts advocated for a strong chief 
justice. The ABA called for all “administrative power and responsibility for the system placed 
upon the courts themselves, either through a single administrative judge for the whole state, with 
power to appoint a director and staff, or through administrative judges responsible for each 
homogeneous locality and all responsible to a single judge.” Pound took it a step further; the 
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chief justice should no longer hear cases and focus solely on “superintending control over the 
entire system.” 
Willoughby also wished for the Office of the Clerk of the Court to be revised. The clerk 
was to be appointed by the Chief Justice rather than elected (something Pound and the American 
Judicature Society had advocated as well). However where Willoughby separated himself from 
the Society and Pound was in his desire to have this Office “as the center of the administrative 
system of the court”; the other two were silent on the subject or simply assumed the Clerk would 
remain essentially a clerical function. For Willoughby the Office of the Clerk of the Court was in 
“no sense either political or judicial” and entirely administrative, therefore it should be subject to 
the same requirements for efficiency demanded over the other entities in executive branch and 
independent agencies (what he called “the administrative branch”). Thus the Clerk of the Court 
would be appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice, and lower clerks (deputy clerks) 
subject to Clerk of the Court in like fashion. Just as he provided a minimum checklist of chief 
justices Willoughby had a listing for the minimum requirements for this “wholly administrative” 
office. Many of these would become part of the entity called the administrative of courts and 
measured in State Court Organization. 
 that the head of the office shall be appointed and subject to removal by the head of the 
organization of which it is a subordinate unit 
 be subject to the direction, supervision, and control of such superior officer 
 that means shall in fact exist whereby the latter can hold him to strict accountability for 
the manner in which the affairs of his office are conducted that the office itself shall be 
thoroughly organized so that responsibility and the line of authority are definitely located 
and the work so distributed that the most effective use is made of the working personnel 
 that the most efficient methods of business practice and procedure for the actual handling 
of the work are employed 
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 that where there are a number of units performing the same functions, having the same 
duties to perform, and belonging to the same general organization, they should have the 
same organization, and make use of the same methods of procedure 
As with organization, there was a federal precedent at the time. As previously noted 
centralization had occurred for those courts, but administration remained in the Department of 
Justice. Chief Justice William Howard Taft and other federal judges had for years requested a 
transfer of administrative control to the judiciary. The end result was the Administrative Office 
Act of 1939. The budget, personnel, and administrative control of the judiciary were to be 
entirely separated from the Department of Justice. Full administrative control was to be handed 
to the Supreme Court and shared with the Council of Senior Circuit Judges (later revised and 
renamed the Judicial Conference of the United States). The Supreme Court was to appoint a 
Director for the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) who “shall be the 
administrative officer of the United States courts… under the supervision and direction of [the 
Judicial Conference].” 
By the mid-1940s it was recognized that at the state level the idea of a chief justice 
serving daily as the administrative head of the courts was impractical. Solutions were sought 
along the lines of Willoughby’s Office of the Clerk and/or the federal Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts. While indications are there were “court administrators” or “executive 
secretaries” appointed in Connecticut and New Jersey prior to 1948, these individuals were 
essentially personal appointments made by the chief justices to their chambers. Those appointed 
had no formal powers. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1948 came out with a Model Act to Provide for an Administrator for the State Courts based on a 
draft that had been prepared by the ABA prior to the war. (Hartshorne, 1949; Vanderbilt, 1949) 
The handiwork of Vanderbilt, it was essentially adopted wholesale by the New Jersey legislature 
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in 1949. (Woelper, 1950) The Model Act called for a state court administrator and an attendant 
office with assistants to examine every aspect of the judiciary, from funding requests to 
statistical data and business processes of the courts. The administrator was given power over 
“examining the state of the docket and recommending assignment of judges where courts need 
assistance, collect and compile statistics, prepare and submit budget estimates, obtain reports 
from various courts on the state of the business of the courts, and attend to any other matters 
assigned by the court of last resort.” The adoption of these elements in each state would later be 
measured in reports such as State Court Organization. It also placed a statutory burden on all 
judges, clerks, and other offices and officers of the court to cooperate and provide not only 
statistical data but information “relative to the expenditure of public moneys for their 
maintenance and operation.”  
By 1959 nearly half the states had adopted a version of the act by statute or court rule 
(American Judicature Society, 1960) but there was not universal love or affection for the office. 
When the bill creating the position of state-level “judicial administrator” in Virginia was first 
introduced in the 1950, it failed when trial court judges objected to having anyone “administer” 
them. Virginia's Chief Justice Edward Hudgins noted that the term “sounded like a dictator or a 
snooper”. (Conference of Chief Justices, 1950) To placate concerns in Virginia, the office was 
renamed “executive secretary to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.” Often there was a 
statutory or traditional requirement that this person be a judge; Massachusetts only ended the 
requirement that the state court administrator be a trial judge in 2012 when the position of “court 
administrator” was broken away from the office of chief administrative justice of the trial court. 
(HB 3644 of 2012) 
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Today, every state has an administrative office of the courts. Moreover, 48 out of 50 
states have a statutory or constitutional provision that the chief justice, ex officio, through the 
Supreme Court or through a Judicial Council, is the administrative head of the judicial branch in 
the state. (Raftery, 2013) How much authority they opt to exercise or defer to the administrative 
office of the courts varies. Even more critically is the level to which the administrative office is 
actually responsible for trial court activities. In some states centralization is effectively nominal, 
in others expansive. The specific data of this is found in State Court Organization. 
Judicial Rulemaking. More of a legal than administrative or organizational construct, 
judicial rulemaking for the “unified” judiciary meant the ability of courts to create their own 
rules of procedure that were consistent throughout the state. Prior to unification, a series of 
complex laws and statutes dictated the way in which cases were handled. For example if a person 
is sued, do they have 20 days to file their answer or 30 days? A litany of statutes of various 
complexities made this impossible for even the best trained lawyers to fathom at the time. 
Moreover, legislators were often ill-suited to the task, either because they had no knowledge of 
the law or, as was occasionally the case, they were able to enact specialized rules for favored 
entities. This was also used to effectively dictate in hyper-technical detail the conduct of the 
judiciary’s work. For example Pound (1940) noted that by 1900 there were 36 different statutes 
dictating where and when the state’s highest court (Supreme Judicial Court) must sit, 77 for the 
state’s main trial court (Superior), 142 for Probate Court, and 274 for District Court. 
Today all states give their supreme court, judicial councils, and/or chief justices powers 
to set rules of practice and procedure, most through constitutional provisions but some through 
statute. Still other states have interpreted the constitutional granting of “general administrative 
authority” (Kansas) or “administration and supervision” (Idaho) over the judiciary as having 
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implicit within it the authority to promulgate such rules. Of all three elements of unification, 
judicial rulemaking is the only one that has been adopted universally. 
Empirical Studies of Unification 
First measure Writing 25 years after their publication, Ashman and Parness (1974) 
commended Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration (1949) as “paving the way toward 
the actual meaning of the unified court concept.” Authored by former ABA President and now 
Chief Justice of New Jersey Arthur Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 
was the first ever formulaic effort at defining how “unified” state courts were by measuring how 
much they adopted the tenants of unification, as put forth by the American Bar Association in 
1938’s Standards of Judicial Administration. Minimum Standards focused on only three areas in 
Standards and divided them on a scale from 1 (little or no control) to 4 (total):  
 Unified judicial system: measures of the chief justice’s ability to assign judges to 
specialized dockets (e.g. small claims), move judges to other courts/areas to 
equalize work, assign a judge’s caseload to another judge, require records be kept 
by judges and in what manner, require judges to report on the status of their work, 
appoint all personnel, including specifically clerks, direct how personnel are to 
conduct their work and centralized management & control of finances for the 
judicial branch. 
 Creation of a Judicial Council: with an emphasis on the idea of a council’s power 
and authority 
 Judicial statistics: noting that statistics are the only way to “enable the court to 
check on the efficiency of its own work” this examined whether statistical 
reporting, preferably quarterly, was being done on a comprehensive and 
consistent basis. 
For the first time there was now a general gauge of unification. It also indicated perhaps a 
slight self-interest in New Jersey Chief Justice Vanderbilt. There was only one state that was 
listed as having substantial unification, diverse judicial council with judicial rulemaking 
authority, and a comprehensive, regular, and comparative statistical system: New Jersey. 
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First studies For decades the assumption of those advocating for unification was that it 
would increase efficiency in the courts. In adherence to the principles of scientific management, 
this meant simply more outputs (disposition of cases) with the same resources 
(courts/judges/staff). Studies had been done at the local level, going at least as far back as 1922 
when Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter conducted as examination of the local Cleveland court 
system and how it handled criminal cases. (Cleveland Foundation, 1922) But as of the 1970s no 
one had measured the extent to which states were “unified” since Minimum Standards in 1949 
and absolutely no one had ever attempted to link unification to performance in an empirical way. 
What studies were conducted in this time period examined two questions: what states were 
“unified” and why did they move towards unification. 
A 1965 federal effort to examine and improve criminal justice at the state level 
(President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice) led to the 
creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and a marked interest in the 
unification of courts. This interest was based on a 1967 Commission Task Force report that 
claimed unified state court systems were better at administering justice. However, the report 
itself reflected the loose and confused development of the word “unification” by the time. The 
task force cited to the state of Michigan, which in 1961 had in fact amended its constitution to 
declare itself a unified court system and the judicial branch made up of “one court of justice” 
with the supreme court given “general superintending authority” over the trial courts. However, 
there was no consolidation of the state’s courts and administration control was retained at county 
government/municipal level or in the hands of individual courts. As late as 2001, Michigan 
remained in practice a very decentralized state with little consolidation aside from the 
abandonment of a special court in Detroit. (Baar, 2001) 
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Despite the confusion over the definition of “unified” LEAA was convinced anecdotally 
unified state court systems were better and was prepared to offer grants and funding to determine 
the “empirical consequences of state court unification” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1979; 
Flango, 1981) To start, they commissioned a survey to try and gauge the work of state courts and 
the levels of at consolidation. The survey was conducted in 1971-1972 and published by the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics as the National Survey of Court 
Organization, 1971-1972. (1972) This raw data was then consolidated by the Bureau of the 
Census into the report National Survey of Court Organization and published a year later by the 
LEAA. (1973) The National Survey of Court Organization gave a listing of not only the 
differences in state court trial systems (single-tier, two-tier, and multi-tier) but also insights into 
the work of judges such as time spent on civil matters vs. criminal, etc. The National Survey of 
Court Organization would be supplemented in 1975 and in 1977. 
The data from the National Survey of Court Organization provided an opportunity to 
empirically examine unification for the first time. Larry Berkson, Director of Educational 
Programs for the American Judicature Society, made use of the data, along with the ABA’s 1973 
Standards of Court Organization which effectively repeated the call for consolidation, 
centralization, and judicial rulemaking, to attempt to parse out a unification scale. Berkson’s 
work kept consolidation  and judicial rulemaking effectively unchanged from the work going 
back to the 1900s, however he divided centralization into two: centralized management and a 
new category centralized budget and state financing (in later literature he would divide these as 
well, resulting in 5 elements). His measures included elements external to the judicial branch, 
such as the source of funding (state vs. local) and whether the governor could amend or alter the 
judicial branch’s budget request to the legislature. This was a departure from what was 
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previously understood to be “unification” and made the already loose usage of the term 
“unification” all the more so. Berkson’s “unification” was first released in a speech he delivered 
to the 1977 meeting of the American Society for Public Administration and that was later 
published in Justice System Journal. (1978) 
Table 2 Principal Components of Berkson's 16 Indicators of Unification (from Flango (1981)) 
Consolidation and Simplification of Trial Court Structure 
Number of trial courts (1 trial court = 4 points) 
One trial court of general jurisdiction (1 trial court = 4 points) 
Trial courts of limited jurisdiction (0 or 1 court = 4 points) 
Separately administered specialized courts (0 courts = 4 points) 
 
Centralized Rule Making 
Legally charged rule maker (state's highest court = 4 points) 
Actual rule maker (state's highest court = 4 points) 
Legislative veto power (no veto power = 4 points) 
Utilization of rule making (most use = 4 points) 
 
Centralized Management 
Assignment power of supreme court (power to transfer judges = 4 points) 
Role of the state court administrator in supervising trial court administrators (most 
supervision = 4 points) 
Activities of state court administrator. (most activities = 4 points) 
Type of merit system (state-wide merit = 4 points) 
 
Centralized Budgeting and State Financing 
Extent of centralized judicial preparation of the budget (central preparation = 4 points) 
Extent of executive branch participation in budget (executive excluded = 4 points) 
Use of gubernatorial item veto over judicial budget (no authority = 4 points) 
Extent of state financing (80% to 100% = 4 points) 
 
Dill (1978) using the same data as Berkson compiled as part of the 1972 National Survey 
of Court Organization examined unification metrics, starting with Berkson’s 1977 work and its 
16 variables as a starting point. Dill used factor analysis to determine linkages between these 
several elements, finding for example that the governor’s ability to alter the judiciary’s budget 
request and line item veto of the budget once approved by the legislature to have little to do with 
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unification. Dill also found reason to disagree with Berkson’s assessment that centralized 
management and centralized budgeting and state financing are separate components from one 
another, instead suggesting a merger into what he called “management budgeting” with a focus, 
based on the factor analysis, on four elements: 
1. does the state court administrator supervise or have control over trial court 
administration 
2. what at the activities the state court administrator is responsible for 
3. what sort of personnel system does the state use to hire court employees 
4. what percent of the judiciary is state funded 
These first two measures would be directly replicated in State Court Organization and 
form the basis for the measurement of centralization in a state. Dill also created his own scoring 
for unification based on 14 out of 16 elements (i.e. removing the ones related to the governor) 
and found it effectively matched and replicated Berkson’s 1977 survey. Of particular note is the 
relationship Dill found between states that were measured as having “unified” courts and the 
individual components, finding that consolidation and centralization were intertwined but not 
always present in the same state. 
We have found that systems with simplified court structures are not especially likely to 
have internal control, systems with internal control are not especially likely to have 
centralized management-budgeting, and systems with centralized management-budgeting 
are not especially likely to have simplified court structures. Moreover, we have found 
correlations so low as to indicate the absence of relationships between many of the 
individual items comprising the unification index, and, in some instances even between 
pairs of items associated with the same component. 
Dill found that disaggregation into component parts (e.g. the individual 
variables/elements) was critical, which he then demonstrated in the remainder of the piece by 
examining why certain elements of unification exist, for example finding a strong correlation 
between a smaller state size and a greater likelihood of the presence of internal controls for the 
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judiciary and a weaker one for population density and simplified trial court structure. In keeping 
with Gallas’ (1976) descriptions of the localized nature of courts, Dill found that states with 
larger numbers of counties are less likely to have any measure of unification. 
Dill concluded that the assumptions of those seeking unification for 7 decades had, by 
that point, been “large and unproven” and that proponents of unification may have felt no need to 
prove their position that unification mean increased in efficiency because until that point no one 
questioned the assumption. Dill admitted that the data at that time was still lacking with respect 
to many of these issues and were beyond his ability to answer at that time. 
Flango (1981) was critical of Berkson’s 1977 indices for much the same reasons, and 
using similar factor analysis as Dill. Flango’s focus was not so much on the ramifications of 
unification, only on how to measure it. Flango along with Rottman (1992) would return to this 
later and criticize Berkson’s measurement of consolidation as well, arguing that Berkson’s 
division of consolidation itself was troublesome because it effectively double counted (a state 
would receive one score for having more or fewer trial courts, another for the types of court they 
were). Flango and Rottman offered an alternative measure for consolidation, but there was no 
attempt to link this metric to performance or efficiency. 
Subsequent use of the Berkson unification measure was mixed. Fetter (1979) found a 
negative correlation between the degree of ruralness in a state and the extent to which the state 
has adopted the recommendations set forth in the ABA Standards of Court Organization with 
respect to unification. Tarr (1980) used the unification scores to measure unification’s impact on 
“court performance”, but defined “performance” as having to do with aspects internal to the 
branch. Tarr tested the assumptions that unified states should see larger proportion of their 
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judicial budgets going to capital expenditures, more in-service training, a statewide personnel 
system, more funding overall, and statewide information systems. Again, there was no effort to 
try and link unification to the disposition of cases and the study was roundly condemned as 
having little if anything to do with court performance. (Harris & Dodge, 1982) 
Carbon/Berkson When Carbon and Berkson’s Court Reform in the Twentieth Century 
(article) and Court Unification: History, Politics & Implementation (book) first appeared in 
publication in 1978, they served from a qualitative aspect what the prior statistical work offered 
from the quantitative and effort to gauge unification. Funded by the LEAA and the result of 
some 100 interviews conducted in 11 states, the paper and book held fast to Berkson’s vision of 
unification in 5 elements rather that the traditional 3 (consolidation + rulemaking authority + 
central management + state funding + central budgeting). Those interviewed were very critical of 
the unproven assumptions of unification with opponents asserting that little statistical research 
has been undertaken to determine whether a highly centralized administration is more efficient 
than a decentralized system. “In light of all the arguments against this measure, it may not be 
advisable to adopt a centralized system until some countervailing benefits can be demonstrated.” 
Carbon and Berkson found this among the “most compelling arguments offered” and cited a 
statement made by Russell Wheeler at a panel of the 1977 meeting of the American Society for 
Public Administration “You can't say that… the administration of justice is any better or 
worse...[in Georgia, a nonunified state, than in Colorado, a highly unified state]. That would take 
measuring what actually happens in the courts, measuring the output of justice. Nobody has 
gotten around to doing that yet.” It would not be until 1984 that someone did get around to doing 
it. 
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Significance of Judicial Structure: Constellations, Confederations, Federations & 
Unions The first effort at empirically demonstrating a linkage between unification and 
organizational performance was conducted in 1983. Significance of Judicial Structure  
(Henderson, et al., 1984) selected five states and examined them based on three functional areas:  
core technology, administrative support structure, and institutional relations. (Thompson J. D., 
1967) Using face to face interviews and annual reports from the state court systems on case 
clearance rates the report concluded there were four levels of unification: 
 constellations: independent judges and courts bound only by the appellate review of their 
cases 
 confederations: consolidation of trial courts into large, but independent, divisions 
 federations: strong central authority controlling multiple local units 
 unions: highly consolidated trial courts with strong central authority 
An effort was made at analyzing data from the courts in the states for a single year (1980) to 
measure what they called efficiency, defined as dispositions divided by filings. The results found 
that “consolidation does appear to produce slightly higher disposition rates… consolidation 
reforms do provide for better use of judge time although the exact reasons remain to be 
discovered.”  
Table 3 Dispositions/Filings, general jurisdiction courts (1980) (Henderson et al. (1984) Table 10.2) 
 Georgia 
Superior 
Iowa 
District 
Colorado 
District 
New Jersey 
Superior 
Connecticut 
District 
Criminal 0.89 0.96 0.82 1.02 0.93 
Civil 0.83 0.92 0.79 0.61 0.99 
Henderson et al. addressed that any measure of what they called effectiveness, which had 
been dispositions per judge, must be factored against the types of cases. Put another way, a judge 
or a court that handles traffic cases is more likely to have a high disposition rate that a judge or a 
court handling felonies. Thus Henderson and his team suggested that in addition to looking at 
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over all dispositions of cases in a state to compare general jurisdiction trial courts from state to 
state. These courts all handled felonies and higher level civil matters and were therefore close in 
similarly to one another. 
Table 4 Dispositions/Judges, general jurisdiction courts (1980) (Henderson et al. (1984) Table 10.3) 
 Georgia 
Superior 
Iowa 
District 
Colorado 
District 
New Jersey 
Superior 
Connecticut 
District 
Criminal 251 188.5 89.5 122.4 59.9 
Civil 302 532.6 237.8 282.8 576.0 
Total 553 731.1 327.3 405.2 635.9 
Standards Relating to Court Organization By 1990 criticism of unification based in part 
on the confusion and loose usage of the term had effectively reached the American Bar 
Association. In its revision to the Standards Relating to Court Organization the group officially 
kept the language of the ABA’s 1973 standards that kept the call for consolidation, centralization 
and judicial rulemaking, but made two concessions. The first was in its commentary on 
unification, namely that “Unification does not mean rigidity or hierarchical decision making, as 
long as delegation of authority is in accordance with system wide standards and policies.” The 
second was in its reference section, which now included references to Gallas (1976) as well as 
later work by Baar (1980) and others that were critical of the hierarchical notions of unification. 
Wheeler (2007) would note this as recognition that performance standards were more critical to 
the conversation than organizational standards. It also marked a shift in focus from state court 
systems as a whole to individual trial courts. (Nafisi, 2006) 
Classic School and Unification Reexamined 
Unification. Despite the ABA partially backing away from unification, the decades 
between 1980 and 2000 saw continued movement towards unification in state judiciaries as 
measured by the National Survey of Court Organization and later by the State Court 
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Organization series (1980, 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2004). A review of the data for state trial 
courts finds four major movements at centralization and consolidation within this time period in 
Arkansas (2000), California (2000), Minnesota (1983-1987), and North Dakota (1995) in 
addition to smaller efforts to eliminate particular court types or centralize certain powers. For a 
decade after Arkansas & California’s efforts unification effectively remained at a standstill until 
the Great Recession forced states to once again reevaluate unification as a cost savings measure, 
not as a way to improve performance. Two states moved in that direction: Vermont in 2010 and 
New Hampshire in 2011. In the case of Vermont this meant the merger of the state’s Probate, 
Family, and District Courts into the District Court (Working Group on the Restructuring of, and 
Access to, the Judiciary, 2009). For new Hampshire it meant that the state’s District, Probate, 
and Judicial Branch Family Divisions would form a new Circuit Court (New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, 2011). In both instances the driving force was the move for efficiency in 
resource usage and the sharing of judicial caseloads. (National Center for State Courts, 2009)1 
Only two empirical studies of unification were conducted around this period. The first, a 
dissertation (Bolling Swann, 1986) examined unification in 12 states broken down into 4 regions. 
She scaled each state 1-3 (high to low) based upon her own assessment on how well each 
separately met the ABA’s Standards on Court Organization. Bolling Swann then attempted to 
measure efficiency as case clearance rates (as she described it Effectiveness) again on a 1-3 scale 
(3 = “high” case clearance rate). She concluded that unification had no impact and provided her 
data set as an appendix. Unfortunately the data set provided cannot replicate her findings nor did 
                                                 
 
1 Note: The author is an employee of the National Center for State Courts but played no role in the formulation of 
any reports or recommendations by the National Center to either New Hampshire or Vermont judiciaries. 
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she provide a definition of what a “high” case clearance rate was. (Bolling Swann, 1986, 
Appendix D) 
The second attempt in this area was another dissertation (Rasmussen, 1998) that examined 
under what conditions 8 selected states opted to unify their judiciaries over the course of a six 
year period (1990 to 1995). Rasmussen specifically looked at six elements of unification as 
derived from the 1990 ABA Standards on Court Organization and then combined the scores to 
create an index measure for unification in each state. 
 Single tier or two-tier court structure/trial court consolidation 
 State Supreme Court Justice was as administrative head of the state’s judiciary 
 The existence of an administrative office of the courts 
 The existence of a state court administrator appointed by the chief justice 
 Rulemaking authority vested in the courts, preferably the supreme court 
 State financing for the entire court system 
Rasmussen tested the question of whether unification produced greater effectiveness 
which she defined by calculating the caseload clearance rates for the various trial and appellate 
courts in the 8 selected states but was unable to gather sufficient data from two of her state’s trial 
courts (Louisiana and New Hampshire) to provide conclusions. With her limited data she did 
suggest that there was no difference in trial and appellate court caseload clearance between 
unified and non-unified states. 
Organization and management. At almost the same time that unification was making a 
comeback of sorts, so too were some of the underlying assumptions with the growth of research 
on organizational structure (Fry and Raadschelders, 2008). Glisson and Martin (1980) found a 
centralized, hierarchical management structure is the most important predictor for productivity 
and efficiency. James Q. Wilson (1989) posited that organizational structure matters by focusing 
on outcomes and outputs as the distinction between approaches to bureaucratic action. Wilson 
specifically rejected the argument that “it’s not the organization that’s important it’s the people 
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in it.” Structure can and does vary widely, even within the same policy area, as the federal 
system allows for states to design their own institutions driven by their own cultures (Fitzpatrick 
& Hero, 1988). Structure and organization shape decision-making, implementation, and 
outcomes (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). Research in organizational structure began returning 
to Gulick’s research design and organizational principles and finding some degree of support for 
them. Meier and Bohte literally wrote an “Ode to Luther Gulick” (2000) and elaborated further 
on their findings a few years later (Meier & Bohte, 2003) that span of control, as an aspect of 
centralization, significantly shape policy outcomes. Boyne (2003) was able to produce a meta-
analysis of studies to demonstrate “there is consistent support for a positive relationship between 
centralization and service performance (whether the latter variable is measured as output 
quantity, efficiency or outcomes).” 
Moreover calls were being made for a return to precisely the sort of hierarchical 
administration that had been rejected in decades past. Key to this resurgence started at the federal 
level with the National Performance Review in 1993 and its state counterpart, the Winter 
Commission Reports, both driven by the New Public Management movement. (Milakovich & 
Gordo, 2012) The National Commission on the State and Local Public Service, which former 
Mississippi Governor William F. Winter chaired, was commissioned by the Nelson A. 
Rockefeller Institute of Government to address the issue of governance reform at the state and 
local level. The first report “Hard Truths/Tough Choices” (1993) was presented to President Bill 
Clinton just two months before Clinton would direct the creation of the National Performance 
Review to conduct at the federal level the sort of review that the Winter Commission had done at 
the state/local. (Milakovich & Gordo, 2012) A substantial portion of the report focused on 
strengthening of “executive leadership” coupled with centralization of authority and operations 
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at the state level. The specific recommendations included reducing the number of independently 
elected cabinet-level officials, consolidating or elimination as many overlapping or 
underperforming units as possible, and making use of an “executive budget” approach where the 
entire budget must be approved, amended, or rejected as a single bill. While not specifically 
addressing state judiciaries, the Winter Commission’s message of centralized authority and the 
elimination of elected officials (in the case of the courts elected clerks) have similarities and 
parallels. 
Organizational Performance Measurement 
The discussion involving unification focused on the judiciary as an organization that was 
failing to meet its most basic tasks, namely, the disposition of cases in a timely manner. The call 
for “efficiency” in the judiciary was repeated over and over, but with no specific means of 
measurement. When it came to collecting data on even the most basic of metrics of “efficiency”, 
cased filed and cases disposed, courts were either unwilling and/or unable to gather then 
information. That said Henderson et al (1984) offered up two possible metrics in their discussion 
of “effective” and “efficient” courts in a unified (or non-unified) state: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑠
= Efficiency 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ′𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
= Effectiveness 
Performance indicators such as these can help illuminate an institution’s progress toward 
the accomplishment of its mission, goals, and objectives. Such indicators serve a dual purpose, 
first to guide decisions and second as a tool of accountability so that organizational performance 
can be articulated. Performance indicators can be used to assess inputs, processes, outputs, and 
outcomes. (Behn, 2003). The relationship between these variables helps to determine 
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organizational efficiency, effectiveness, and quality (Frackmann, 1987) or “economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness”. (Brown & Pyers, 1988). 
The most basic model of performance evaluation is the output model: simply measure or 
collect data on the number of desired items that result and determine success. Behn (2003) calls 
this effectiveness, did the agency achieve the results it set out to produce? This measure however 
utterly fails to take into account the amount of effort or resources brought to bear in the 
production. There are several alternatives, two of which can be couched as forms of “efficiency”. 
The first is court-specific and contends with clearance rates (Dakolias, 1999; Ostrom, Kauder & 
LaFountain, 2000): take the number of cases filed and divide by the number of cases disposed. A 
broader, classic model of performance is the input-output model. (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) 
What is the ratio of inputs, such as judges, to outputs (cases disposed)? (Behn, 2003). When 
workers are the “input” in question, this form of efficiency is called labor productivity. (Hatry, 
1978)  
It should be noted that both case clearance rates and input-output/labor productivity do 
not tell us the quality of the end product and is devoid of any values judgment at all. Highsaw 
(1962) noted that “the input-output definition of efficiency must be reconciled with the humane 
and social objectives of government.” One way in which those objectives can be reconciled is 
through the introduction of several additional elements. Process measurement seeks to measure 
the mechanisms by which the inputs are converted to outputs. It answers Behn’s (2003) 
questions: How are the various inputs interacting to produce the outputs? What is the 
organizational black box actually doing to the inputs to convert them into the outputs? Outcomes 
measure the benefits or changes that result from the output. “Outputs are what work the 
organization does, outcomes are what these outputs accomplish” (Hatry, 2006) Impact measures 
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go further and answer “What did the agency itself accomplish? What is the difference between 
the actual outcomes and the outcomes that would have occurred if the agency had not acted?” 
(Behn, 2003) 
Assessing Organizational Performance. Addressing the area of organizational 
performance, Cameron (1980) identified four formulations: goal attainment, system resource, 
internal processes, and strategic constituencies. Goal attainment is the most widely used model 
(Rahim, 2010) and measures the ability of the organization to achieve its goals or objectives. 
This applies at the organizational level (Etzioni, 1960; Etzioni, 1964)  and within the 
organization at the individual level. (Georgopoulos & Tannenbaum, 1957) The measures of goal 
attainment often take the form of productivity or efficiency. (Rahim, 2010) Specifically, this 
model defines productivity as the number of units produced and efficiency as the output or input 
units produced or delivered within a given period of time. (Miles, 1980) From this data can be 
determined the level of “success” or “failure” demonstrated in an organization. (Mohr, 1973; 
Simon, 1964) While apparently simple, the goal attainment model relies on the assumption of 
clearly delineated, static goals. (Etzioni, 1960) Such goals are only rarely written down and even 
if they are, there may be a tension between the “official” organizational objectives and the 
“operative” objectives that are actually being perused. (Perrow, 1961) Such operative goals may 
exist in strategic plans or policy statements, but not always. (Newman, 2001) Despite these 
problems, goal attainment remains markedly popular in the literature and development of public 
administration and organizational measurement; public services are expected to achieve and/or 
produce some good or service that is both tangible and satisfactory to key stakeholders. What 
remains to determine is how to quantify each of these elements (Boyne, 2003) 
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Table 5 Logic Model for Court Unification (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004) 
 Inputs Activities/Processes Outputs Outcomes/impacts 
Definition what resources 
go into a 
program 
what activities the 
program undertakes 
what is 
produced 
through those 
activities 
the changes or 
benefits that result 
from the program 
Examples e.g. money, 
staff, 
equipment 
e.g. development of 
materials, training 
programs 
e.g. number of 
booklets 
produced, 
workshops 
held, people 
trained 
e.g. increased skills/ 
knowledge/ 
confidence, leading 
in longer-term to 
promotion, new job, 
etc. 
Court 
Unification 
Judges, funds, 
clerks 
Administration of the 
courts, trials, writing 
of opinion, filing and 
allocation of 
documents 
Cases Disposed Fair and impartial 
justice delivered 
speedily 
 
Summary and Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here? 
Confronted with an increasingly large and diverse society, U.S. states in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s were wedded to the idea that highly decentralized courts were the answer. 
“Multiplication of tribunals is the first attempt of the law to meet the demand for specialization 
and division of labor. Yet it is at best a crude device.” (Pound, 1914) Legal reform advocates at 
the time offered up as a solution unification to address these issues. Based upon notions of 
simplified organizational structure (consolidation) and top-down hierarchical control 
(centralization), unification was a product of the Progressive era’s desire for efficiency, science, 
and mechanistic thought. These notions remained locked in place over the course of the next 
several decades, failing utterly to take into account the changes in organizational and 
management theory and failing to demonstrate an empirical basis for the assertions that more 
“unified” state courts were more efficient. When public administration did turn its attention to 
the subject of unification it found the concept lacking, but here too those who examined it 
assumed it was a failure or had no impact on performance. What empirical evidence that there 
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was in the area of unification simply measured how unified a state was or why it unified, not 
whether that unification had any impact on the performance of the state’s judiciary as a whole. 
One of its harshest critics (Gallas, 1979) pined for empirical data “Research focused on ends 
rather than means offers promise for an escape from the present conceptual cul de sac.” All this 
leaves one unanswered question: Does unification have an impact on court performance at all 
and if so is it a positive one? 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
The primary goal of this research is to examine if there is a correlation between a state’s 
level of judicial unification and the state judiciary’s performance. A positive finding would 
buttress arguments made for a century that centralization of power at the state level and 
consolidation of trial courts will have a net positive effect on the court ability to dispose of cases. 
A secondary goal is to determine which of these elements, or the individual components they 
contain, have a positive impact. As such, variables that may explain a judiciary’s ability to 
dispose of cases and that define “unification” are to be examined. This study utilized a 
quantitative approach within a cross-sectional research design. Secondary data derived from 
State Court Organization and State Court Caseload Statistics was utilized to quantify the 
dependent and independent variables. This chapter will focus on the research questions, 
hypotheses, research design, units of analysis and population, data sources and collection, 
measurement of variables, analytical techniques, and limitations. 
Research question 
This study seeks to address the question of whether or not unification has an impact on 
court performance and if so is it a positive one. This relies on the notion organizational 
performance as measurable by goal attainment and that the goal to be attained by court 
unification is the disposition of cases. The question has been unanswered for a century; its 
answer one way or the other will help those in the law and courts community determine whether 
or not consolidation and centralization of state court systems can help address the issue case 
disposition. It would also assist legislatures and potentially the public at large that would have to 
vote on any effort at unification in a state make their determinations as well. 
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Hypotheses 
Efficiency1 
H0 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, it has NO impact on the total 
clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, it has an impact on the total 
clearance rate 
 
H0 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, it has NO impact on the total 
clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, then it has an impact on the 
total clearance rate 
 
Efficiency2 
H0 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, then it has NO impact on the 
per judge clearance rate 
H1 If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, then it has an impact on the 
per judge clearance rate 
 
H0 If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, then it has NO impact per judge 
clearance rate 
Population and Sample 
All 50 states are eligible for inclusion in the study. For this study 26 were excluded due to 
the fact that they did not report data for either the independent variable (1 state: Wyoming) or the 
dependent variables (25 states). Caseload data (cases filed and cases disposed, plus number of 
judges) were obtained from the remaining 24 states for the 2013, the latest year for which 
comparable data across states is available. 
Data sources 
State Court Organization The State Court Organization series began in 1980 as a way to 
examine the structure and governance of the state judiciaries. Under the National Survey of State 
Court Organization from the 1970s, this new series asked more questions regarding governance 
and avoided court-level data. It was funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics but relied on the 
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cooperation of the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court 
Administrators and data collection by the newly created National Center for State Courts. State 
Court Organization, 1980 also relied for the first time on a standardized set of definitions (the 
State Court Model Statistical Dictionary) to assist in tabulation of caseload and other data that 
would otherwise be incomparable across states. 
The 1980 data collection for State Court Organization was repeated in 1993, 1998, and 
2004. As with the prior iterations, the survey questions were vetted and approved by a committee 
of the Conference of State Court Administrators. This latest iteration kept many of the same 
questions as the earlier versions and added new ones to reflect the changing needs of the state 
courts. Funding for implementation of the survey was from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Starting with the 2011 data collection the survey methodology changed from a paper-and-pencil 
survey to an online one. Links to the online survey tool were sent via email to the State Court 
Administrator in each state, who was then able to answer the questions directly or delegate to 
staff the ability to access the survey tool and answer some or all of the questions. Data was 
collected and the final report was posted as an online database in March 2013 located at 
www.ncsc.org/sco. 
For purposes of this research, data from 2 particular aspects of the survey were used to 
measure the independent variables Centralized Judicial Administration and Consolidated Court 
Structure. 
 Table 13 (Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC): Responsibilities for Trial 
Court Functions) asked “For each function, please select the level of the AOC’s 
responsibility. If the responsibility for the function is shared with any other entity 
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(e.g. executive branch, local courts), please select shared.” 31 functions were then 
presented with options being “none”, “shared”, or “total”. As noted previously, in 
a completely unified system, the AOC should have “total” responsibility for all 31 
trial court functions (centralized administrative control). These were then coded 
as 1 (AOC responsibility = “total”), 2 (“shared”), and 3 (“none”). A screen 
capture of the survey’s first page is reproduced as Figure 2 below. 
 Table 34 (Trial Courts) asked for a list of the types of trial courts in each state. 
Virginia, for example responded with two: Circuit and District. This information 
gave a count of the number of trial courts types in the state and is used later to 
determine whether a state had a consolidated trial court structure. 
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Figure 2 SCO Table 13 Survey Instrument Example 
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Table 6 List of 31 Trial Court Functions Surveyed in SCO Table 13 
Accounting Facilities Management Liaison to Legislature 
Adult Probation Facilities Security Liaison to Ombudsman 
Appointment of Sitting 
Judges 
Foster Care Review Liaison to Public Information 
Appointment of 
Supplemental Judges 
General Counsel Other Legal Services 
Audits Human Resources Performance Measurement 
Budget Preparation Information Technology Purchasing 
Collection of Legal Financial 
Obligations 
Judicial Education Records Management 
Court Annexed ADR Judicial Performance Research/Planning 
Court Statistics Juvenile Probation Technical Assistance to 
Courts 
Data Processing Law Library Staff  
Emergency Management Legal Research Staff  
State Court Caseload Statistics The National Survey of State Court Organization, in 
addition to collecting information on court structure and governance, also collected statistics on 
the caseloads of the various courts in the United States at the court type level. This required a 
collection of county and local court data and aggregation by the U.S. Census. By 1974 a decision 
was made to remove that portion from the National Survey of State Court Organization and 
transfer it to a separate publication called State Court Caseload Statistics. Rather than 
proactively seeking out data at the county by county level, the National Center for State Courts 
in cooperation with the Conference of State Court Administrators queried the state court 
administrators themselves for the data. Much of it was culled from the judiciary annual reports 
published during the preceding year/years. While initially it was left to the states to define what 
category to put cases in eventually the State Court Model Statistical Dictionary (1980) was 
developed. The Dictionary allowed for consistent reporting across states with different legal, 
statutory, and constitutional definitions for the various case types. 
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Data collection occurs on an annual basis approximately one year after the year to be 
examined. 2007 data for example, was collected in 2008 by contact with the state court 
administrator for the particular state, the data provided in the judiciary’s published annual report 
(where available) or both combination. The data was stored at and obtained from the Court 
Statistics Project at www.courtstatistics.org. 
U.S. Census Data from the U.S. Census’ State and Metropolitan Area Data Book 
provided the number of counties in each state. The number of counties is relevant in that some of 
the literature (Gallas, 1976) suggests states with more counties will always be less unified than 
those with fewer. 
State Exclusion and Comparability 
By relying on two separate secondary sources of data, this research was confronted with 
the problem of not having access to 50-states worth of data. This is due to three related aspects of 
the data itself. First, the reporting system associated with the Court Statistics Project for state 
court case filings and disposition is a voluntary practice. For the entirety of the 30+ years of data 
collection, the Court Statistics Project (CSP) relied on the willingness of the Conference of State 
Court Administrators (COSCA) along with the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) to submit this 
data.  The project itself was partially funded at various federal entities, first the State Justice 
Institute and later the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Despite an official policy that “the National 
Center for State Courts [NCSC] is the national repository and clearinghouse for essential 
reference information on the work of the state courts” cooperation with NCSC in general, and 
CSP in particular, was at the discretion of the individual state, as outlined in CCJ/COSCA 
Resolution 5 adopted in 2012. 
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Second, even in the instance of states that were engaged in active cooperation with the 
Court Statistics Project through the office of state court administrator, it did not necessary mean 
that the courts in a given state were obligated to provide information. Some states have statutes 
that compel the production of such information (for example Tennessee Code Ann. § 16-1-117) 
but aside from such specific mandates the data is submitted on a voluntary basis. Moreover, even 
within a state there may be no universally accepted means of measurement or data collection. 
Nevada, for example, dedicated almost a decade to creating and implementing a uniform system 
that applied to not just the higher courts (District) but the locally controlled ones as well (Justice 
and Municipal) to count cases using the same identifiers and methods. (Jessup, 2014) 
Third, even assuming state court administrators were a) willing to provide data to the 
CSP and b) could count within their state in a consistent manner, it did not necessary follow that 
c) the data was comparable across states. As previously mentioned the 1980 State Court Model 
Statistical Dictionary and later State Court Guide to Statistical Reporting developed in 2005 were 
meant to better “map” state data to allow for comparisons, but the process still relied on staff to 
map state data to definitions from the Dictionary/Guide, something that remains impossible for 
many states to do based on the definitional challenges of each state’s laws and legal 
environment. 
The result of this data collection was as follows: 
 With respect to the Independent Variables (number of trial courts and 
administrative centralization), one state was unwilling or unable to provide 
information as to administrative centralization: Wyoming 
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 With respect to the Dependent Variables (number of cases filed, number of cases 
disposed, number of judges) 25 states were either unwilling to provide data, able 
to provide only incomplete data, or able to provide data that while complete for 
the state as a whole was incomparable to the other states. 
That said, as will be seen in Chapter 4, the 24 states ultimately selected were consist with the 
other states with respect to the Independent Variables (number of trial courts and administrative 
centralization), even if it remains unclear if they are consist with respect to the Dependent 
Variables. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
Overview 
Based upon the literature review and methodological considerations previously, this 
chapter will start by examining the specific forms of analysis used on the dataset collected, 
including the rationales used to exclude certain analysis techniques. Second, the chapter will 
examine the sample aspects of the research in which half of states were excluded for a lack of 
data with respect to the dependent variable. Third, the chapter will look at the two separate 
regression analyses run on the dataset to examine the relationships between the independent 
variables and the two dependent variables. Finally, the chapter concludes with the results of said 
analysis.   
Selection of analytical technique 
A preliminary analysis was conducted using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to 
reduce the 31 factors that make up centralized administration. Factor analysis focuses on 
reducing a set of measures to some smaller number of latent, unobserved variables. In the case of 
EFA this means data reduction; presenting X variables in terms of Y latent variables where X > 
Y. While an EFA sequence was attempted with the data from the 49 states, attempting the same 
with only the data elements from the 24 states available proved impossible; the lack of 
observations made such a reduction impossible given that the number of factors to be reduced 
was greater than the number of observed states (31 > 24). 
Based on the findings of the Exploratory Factor Analysis it was determined that a more 
reasonable approach would be to create a composite score made of the 31 centralized 
administration items. Where single indicators are scored on the same scale and can be assumed 
to be of roughly equal relevance, it is possible to simply compute the sum or arithmetic mean of 
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the raw scores as a composite score. (Marcus, 2006) While the use of a composite score 
eliminates the possibility of measuring more nuanced differentials between and among the 
individual elements that make up the independent and dependent variables, this method is 
arguably an improvement over prior efforts by Bolling-Swann and others that relied on few 
observations/states and fewer measures within those states. Moreover the creation of such a ratio 
scale allowed for the use of an ordinary least squares regression in lieu of an EFA where all prior 
work had relied on t-tests or descriptive statistics alone. 
Independent Variables 
The composite score for each state's level of centralization was derived by adding the 
total values (3 – No Responsibility, 2 – Shared Responsibility, 1 – Total Responsibility) for the 
31 central management elements as show in Appendix A. The resulting scores for the 24 states 
ultimately used are indicated in Table 7. The measurement of the level of consolidation was the 
number of trial court types within each state. States with higher numbers of trial court types were 
deemed to be less consolidated. The final variable, counties, was used as a control based on 
Gallas’ supposition that a state with more counties would be inherently less “unified” given the 
number of centers of power available. (i.e. each county would have its own leader and 
leadership). The data is indicated in Table 7. 
Table 7 Independent Variable Data: 24 states 
State 
Centralization 
Average 
Number of 
Trial Court 
Types 
Number of 
Counties or 
Equivalents 
Alabama 1.74 4 67 
Alaska 1.90 2 30 
Arizona 2.13 4 15 
California 2.19 1 58 
Florida 2.35 2 67 
Hawai'i 1.71 2 5 
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Idaho 1.87 2 44 
Illinois 2.00 1 102 
Indiana 2.29 6 92 
Iowa 1.90 1 99 
Kentucky 1.74 3 120 
Maryland 2.16 3 24 
Michigan 2.16 5 83 
Missouri 2.35 2 115 
Nebraska 1.71 4 93 
Nevada 2.32 3 17 
New Hampshire 2.32 2 10 
New Jersey 1.87 3 21 
New York 1.45 10 62 
Ohio 2.32 5 88 
Texas 2.87 6 254 
Utah 1.68 3 29 
Vermont 1.74 2 14 
Washington 2.42 3 39 
AVERAGE 2.05 3.29 64.5 
In using such a limited sample a question arises as to whether or not the sample selected 
is representative of the population as a whole. One way to address that issue at least with respect 
to the independent variables (centralization and number of court types) is to examine the means 
of the sample selected (the 24 state sample) against the 25 states not selected due to lack of data 
for the dependent variable. The 50th state, Wyoming, had no data with respect to either variable. 
A Two-Sample T-Test compares the means between two groups on the same dependent 
variable to determine if they are equal or vary from one another. The null hypothesis always 
assumes that the means are equal. An example of such a test would be to determine whether 
student exam scored differed based on gender with the dependent variable being the scores and 
the independent variables being gender (male and female). If the results of the test are significant 
(p < 0.05) then the null is rejected and there is a statistically significant difference between the 
means. 
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Here, the Two-Sample T-Tests were run on each of the 31 separate elements that made 
up centralized administration as well as the number of trial courts. In none of these 32 tests was a 
significant difference found between the averages of the 24 states included and the 25 states 
excluded (p = .127 - .414) whether or not equal variances were assumed or not assumed. The full 
results are available in Appendix A. Therefore, while it may not be possible to speak of whether 
the 24 states selected are comparable with respect to the dependent variables, it is possible to 
suggest that these states are comparable with respect to the independent variables. 
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Table 8 Two-Sample T-Tests: Sampled states vs. Non-Sampled States 
Group Statistics 
 INCLUDE N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
AverageCount 
dimensi
on1  
Include 24 2.026881725 .3084810105 .0629684226 
Exclude 25 1.948387120 .3560585176 .0712117035 
NumberOfTrialCourts 
dimensi
on1  
Include 24 3.29 2.032 .415 
Exclude 25 4.20 2.062 .412 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
AverageCount Equal variances 
assumed 
.654 .423 .823 47 .414 .0784946050 .0953412049 -.113307 .2702963696 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.826 46.524 .413 .0784946050 .0950585554 -.112790 .2697794170 
NumberOfTrialCourts Equal variances 
assumed 
.910 .345 -1.553 47 .127 -.908 .585 -2.085 .269 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.553 46.965 .127 -.908 .585 -2.085 .268 
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Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables relied on three separate data elements: statewide total incoming 
caseload, statewide total outgoing caseload, and the number of judges present in each state. The 
year select for data collection was 2013 as it is the latest available. From these were computed 
the case clearance rates (Efficiency1) and case clearance rate per judge for each state 
(Efficiency2). The data is indicated in Table 9. 
Table 9 Dependent Variable Data: 24 states 
State 
Statewide 
Total 
Incoming 
Caseload 
Statewide 
Total 
Outgoing 
Caseload 
Statewide 
Case 
Clearance 
Rate 
Number of 
Judges 
Statewide 
Case 
Clearance 
Rate Per 
Judge 
Alabama 1387788 1335007 0.96 633 2109.02 
Alaska 135094 136265 1.01 62 2197.82 
Arizona 2171082 2360525 1.09 416 5674.34 
California 7900336 6823371 0.86 1695 4025.59 
Florida 3731145 3901983 1.05 921 4236.68 
Hawai'i 482876 462053 0.96 68 6794.90 
Idaho 381508 420720 1.10 134 3139.70 
Illinois 3229146 3164753 0.98 514 6157.11 
Indiana 1547345 1527103 0.99 391 3905.63 
Iowa 822442 846332 1.03 337 2511.37 
Kentucky 1011963 1018637 1.01 261 3902.82 
Maryland 2139962 2289044 1.07 325 7043.21 
Michigan 3766430 3842350 1.02 572 6717.40 
Missouri 2856058 2629068 0.92 719 3656.56 
Nebraska 481582 489027 1.02 131 3733.03 
Nevada 956887 945025 0.99 79 11962.34 
New Hampshire 155020 155074 1.00 89 1742.40 
New Jersey 7472421 7475753 1.00 678 11026.18 
New York 3908547 3684220 0.94 3110 1184.64 
Ohio 3527329 3547851 1.01 954 3718.92 
Texas 13781132 13597778 0.99 3070 4429.24 
Utah 778280 792671 1.02 248 3196.25 
Vermont 153155 146034 0.95 45 3245.20 
Washington 2499134 2379226 0.95 398 5977.95 
AVERAGE 2719860.92 2665411.25 1.00 660.42 4678.68 
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Regression 
The average Centralization Score for the 24 states selected was 2.05 on a scale from 3 
(No Responsibility of AOC for Trial Court Functions) to 1 (Total Responsibility) and ranged 
from 1.45 (New York) to 2.87 (Texas). Despite being on opposite ends of the Centralization 
scale, they were 23rd (Texas tied with Indiana) and 24th in terms of consolidation scores with 6 
and 10 trial court types, respectively. Several other states that had high centralization scores had 
low consolidation scores. As a result, there was a negative Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the reported level of centralization and the level of consolidation, however it was not 
statistically significant (r = -0.40, p > .005) 
Table 10 Correlation between Number of Trial Court Types and Centralization Average 
Correlations 
 
Number of Trial 
Court Types 
Centralization 
Average 
Number of Trial Court Types 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.040 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .852 
N 24 24 
Centralization Average 
Pearson Correlation -.040 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .852  
N 24 24 
 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was run to test the relationship between case 
clearance rates (Efficiency1) and the level of unification (centralization and consolidation). The 
results are found in Table 11. The model resulted in a negative Adjusted R Square, indicating the 
model fits the dataset badly. Moreover, none of the variables were statistically significant at the 
.05 criterion (p = .600, .880, and .955). Therefore, it is not possible from this data to reject the 
null hypothesis that if a state has a more centralized judicial administration and/or has a more 
consolidated trial court structure it has NO impact on the total clearance rate. Only Centralization 
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Average appears to have any impact albeit one that is small (B = .006) and not statistically 
significant (.880 > .05). 
 
Table 11 Regression for Efficiency1 (Case Clearance Rates) 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 .124a .015 -.132 .055949591350 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Centralization Average, Number of Trial Court 
Types, Number of Counties or Equivalents 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .991 .082  12.040 .000 
Number of Counties or 
Equivalents 
.000 .000 -.139 -.533 .600 
Number of Trial Court Types .000 .006 .013 .057 .955 
Centralization Average .006 .040 .038 .153 .880 
a. Dependent Variable: 2013 Statewide Case Clearance Rate 
Null Hypothesis 1: If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, it has NO 
impact on the total clearance rate 
 
Result 1: Higher levels of centralized judicial administration do not appear to have an 
impact on the total clearance rate 
 
Null Hypothesis 2: If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, it has NO impact 
on the total clearance rate 
 
Result 2: Higher levels of consolidated trial court structure do not appear to have an 
impact on the total clearance rate 
A second ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was run to test the relationship between 
case clearance rates per judge (Efficiency2) and the level of unification (centralization and 
consolidation). The results are found in Table 12. The model resulted in a positive Adjusted R 
Square of .045, indicating the model explains 4.5% of the variance between the states when it 
comes to case clearance rates per judge. However, none of the individual variables were 
statistically significant at the .05 criterion (p = .109, .134, and .939). Therefore, it is possible not 
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from this data to reject the null hypothesis that if a state has a more centralized judicial 
administration and/or has a more consolidated trial court structure it has NO impact on the total 
clearance rate per judge. 
Of the three variables used, Centralization Average appears to have a large positive 
impact (B = 3124) that weighs against centralization. As noted previously the greater the level of 
average centralization score, the less centralized a state was considered (an average 
centralization score of 1 would indicate total centralized control). Here, for every unit increase in 
Centralized Average, judges in the state are predicted to process 3124 more cases, holding all 
other variables constant. The other main variable to be tested was consolidation in the form on 
the number of trial court types. It too was not statistically significant (p = .939) and seemed to 
suggest only a very minor impact on case clearance rate per judge; for every one additional trial 
court type judges were able to dispose of 22 fewer cases. Using the model displayed in Table 12 
it appears that there is no relationship can be drawn between either the levels of centralized 
judicial administration or a consolidated court structure and the total clearance rate for a state's 
judiciary. The inability to detect a statistically significant relationship between the variables 
weighs against the assumptions in both the literature and the constitutional/statutory application 
of unification techniques in U.S. states over the last century. Admittedly it is not possible that the 
dataset, lacking as it does information for one-half of states with respect to clearance rates, is 
able to completely dismiss the possibility that there is no impact (positive or negative). The fact 
that the p values were so high (.109, .134, and .939) would indicate it is highly unlikely. 
Moreover, the use of 24 states is broader and more expansive than prior efforts that used from 6-
12 states, indicating that the inability to reject the null could be relied upon with more confidence 
than prior efforts. 
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Null Hypothesis 3: If a state has a more centralized judicial administration, then it has NO 
impact on the per judge clearance rate  
 
Result 3: Higher levels of centralized judicial administration do not appear to have an 
impact on the per judge clearance rate and if they do it appears to be a negative one. 
 
Null Hypothesis 4: If a state has a more consolidated trial court structure, then it has NO 
impact per judge clearance rate  
 
Result 4: Higher levels of consolidated trial court structure do not appear to have an 
impact on the per judge clearance rate. 
 
Table 12 Regression for Efficiency2 (Case Clearance Rates Per Judge) 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 .412a .170 .045 2.5938584998409 
Predictors: (Constant), Number of Trial Court Types, Centralization Average, 
Number of Counties or Equivalents 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -474.570 3815.524  -.124 .902 
Centralization Average 3123.900 1863.512 .384 1.676 .109 
Number of Counties or 
Equivalents 
-18.323 11.727 -.374 -1.562 .134 
Number of Trial Court Types -21.954 283.245 -.017 -.078 .939 
a. Dependent Variable: 2013 Statewide Case Clearance Rate Per Judge 
The assumption of unification had always been that it was a net positive for the efficiency 
of state judiciaries. The examination of the dataset with respect to the per judge clearance rate 
however, is at best inconclusive on the subject with respect to consolidated trial court structure. 
At the other end, and in seeming contravention to the assumptions of unification, centralized 
judicial administration appears to have a net negative impact on the per judge clearance rate. The 
model shows that the independent variable for centralization itself is not statistically significant, 
however if the advocates of unification were correct we should expect to see both a significant 
impact and a positive one at that. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overview 
The purpose of this study was to explore empirically the relationship between court 
unification and the performance of the judiciary to address the research question 
Are unified state court systems more efficient than non-unified? 
The results from the analysis would seem to suggest that there is no evidence to support 
the contention advocated for nearly a century that would answer this question in the affirmative. 
While the analysis itself was limited (a single-year, 24 states) it was of a larger scope than the 
prior research in this area, suggesting greater reliability. This concluding chapter then seeks to 
offer a review of current status of research in the area and make recommendations for both 
policy actions based on the analysis as well as future avenues for research. 
Summary 
This study marks the first large scale attempt to directly measure empirically the level of 
unification of each state court system in terms of centralized administrative authority and 
consolidation of court types and measure efficiency at the state. The few prior studies in the area 
1) subjectively defined some states as more/less unified, 2) relied on data extrapolations for 
multiple years of analysis 3) relied on a handful of states and/or 4) provided results that were 
impossible to replicate. This study makes the case that a linkage cannot be determined for certain 
with the limited data available but that unification does continue to be a point of interest for state 
court systems. 
The study should also be read as a caution or warning against consolidation and 
centralization for its own sake, something that lead to the abandonment of unification as a 
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driving judicial reform force in the 1970s in favor of examining individual court performance. 
There also remains the outstanding question of which states are more or less “unified”, a more 
political and often time legal or constitutional question than an empirical one. That said, this 
study offered effectively a return to earlier measures for unification that relied on survey data to 
determine unification as a series of measures along multiple dimensions rather than as simply a 
binary function (i.e. a state is, or is not, “unified”). These multiple dimensions offered the 
independent and control variables, while the measures of efficiency offered the dependent for 
this study. 
Theoretical Framework 
Unification formed the basis for much of the legal community’s push for judicial reform 
for a century. Inefficiencies in state court performance were attributed to three basic problems: 1) 
there were too many different trial court types with overlapping, overly specialized, and 
confusing jurisdictions, 2) there was a desperate need for a general administrative authority to 
measure, control, and direct the judicial branch as a whole rather than as a myriad of 
dysfunctional autonomous units and 3) that the laws and rules of practice and procedure in the 
courts should be handed off to this centralized administrative authority. The solution offered up 
was a product of the times, reflecting the interested in the early 1900s of scientific management 
and the belief that Weberian bureaucratic/hierarchical structures could be effectively applied to 
the courts in the guide of efficiency. This reduced the role of judges, clerks, and court staff to 
that of employees in an assembly line process where the outputs where the outputs were all 
effectively the same: cases closed, justice rendered. Unification sought to concentration on the 
organizational structure and control of that structure, rather than examinations of law and statute, 
as a means to that end. 
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Efficiency 
Whether because the data was not available, or because it was and no one was interested 
in demonstrating its impact, the question of whether a state with a unified judicial system was 
“better” was left to subjective belief and opinion. By the 1970s, however, several efforts were 
made to measure the first part of the question, which was or was not more unified. The second 
portion, what state was “better”, relied on opinion of lawyers. Political scientists and public 
administration scholars attempted remove the process from being the exclusive domain of 
lawyers by applying empirical tests and settled on two measures for efficiency. The first focused 
on the state’s overall ability to clear cases filed in its trial courts each year while the second 
focused on how many such cases judges were disposing per year. These were specifically not 
questions of justice, equity, or equality and did not seek to venture into areas that were better 
contented with by legal and constitutional scholars. Instead, efficiency asked, and asks, if cases 
are being delayed or denied a final outcome. Today, many state courts are effectively measuring 
how they are doing this at the state level, but many still do not. Moreover, because of the 
numerous differences in the ways state courts define for legal or constitutional reasons when a 
case is open or closed, reliance on time measures across states is effectively impossible. There is 
no consistent way to measure timeliness from trial court to trial court, sometimes even within a 
state. The use of case filing and dispositions, however, has the benefit of a central definition 
established by the National Center for State Court’s Court Statistics Project in conjunction with 
the Conference of State Court Administrators. This data therefore allows for the first time a 
consistent metric across states. 
Principal Findings 
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An ordinary least squares regression was the methodology used to determine the elements 
of unification which were strong predictors of efficiency. Initially all 50 states were included; 24 
states were used. 
Inability to find a link between unification and efficiency 
In sum, a relationship between managerial performance and court performance could not 
be demonstrated or shown. Even taking into account the limitations of this study, the inability to 
find any linkage between the level of unification in a state and the efficiency of that state's 
judiciary in terms of case clearance is striking. The operating public policy assumption for a 
century had been that there was not only a direct linkage but that it was a positive one. As noted 
previously the used dataset does not support this contention and, at least with respect to cases 
cleared per judge, would seem to perhaps weigh against unification. This inability to make such 
a link has several ramifications. 
First, opposition to repeal or roll back efforts at unification (the creation of more court 
types, the devolving of power back down to the local court level and away from centralized 
administration) should be reexamined. Legislatures in California and Kansas have in recent years 
moved towards removing the centralized administrative aspects of their state judiciaries. In the 
case of California, the state's Judicial Council was prohibited from moving funding without the 
consent of 2/3rds of trial courts. In Kansas, the power to name local chief judges, set salaries, 
make expenditures, and most human resources functions was removed from the Supreme Court 
and granted to the local judges. In both instances the central authorities argued that it would lead 
to ultimately harm the ability of the judiciary to function, echoing the assumptions of unification. 
However, this research would seem to suggest that at worst it would have no impact on 
efficiency. 
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Second, efforts to expand unification in other states will have to rely on arguments other 
than efficiency. Cost savings, for example, has proven in the past to be a motivator rather than 
caseload efficiency. Case clearance rates may remain the same, the argument goes, but the 
amount of money required to clear those cases can be reduced. Additional arguments in favor 
may also be required in order to develop the concept beyond simple faith that unification is a 
panacea for whatever particular ails exist in a court system. 
Third, the inability to find a linkage between unification and efficiency on a larger scale 
could make way for more focused development on individual elements of unification. This study 
included a composite score/index for 31 different elements of centralized administrative control 
over trial court operations. Rather than conceding all such functions to state control, perhaps 
concession of a select few could have a benefit. Having a single centralized information 
technology system, for example, may prove to be beneficial in terms of efficiency, leaving 
control and operation of the physical plant associated with courthouses to local government and 
courts. Selective application of unification principles, rather than wholesale adoption, may have 
a positive impact. 
Multifaceted unification 
A key finding of this research is to give an understanding, or at least an alternative 
metric, for what states are more or less “unified.” This has been a highly contentious and even 
constitutional issue; state constitutions identify, and several state supreme courts have self-
identified, their state as “unified” and use that as the basis for legal interpretations as to their 
authority. (Raftery 2013) Researchers had for decades used subjective, objective, and mixed 
approaches to come up with an answer of what state was more or less unified than another. Most 
(Vanderbilt, 1949; Dill, 1978; Berkson, 1978; Flango 1981; Flango & Rottman 1992) relied on 
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the reduction of an entire state to a single metric (usually made up of several measures) that 
created a unification matrix. One critical finding is the wide disparity between unification when 
it comes to the individual elements that make up centralized administration or a consolidated 
court system. Michigan and Missouri, two of the states with the lowest measures of Centralized 
Administration Authority, yet Michigan’s 1964 constitution declares it is “one court of justice” 
and the Missouri Supreme Court has held that the state's 1976 constitutional revisions created a 
declared a “unified system of Missouri courts” in that state. (Raftery, 2013) Contrast this with 
Hawai'i, which had the third highest Centralized Administration Authority score, a consolidated 
court system (general jurisdiction and limited jurisdiction), but is not legally defined as 
“unified.” 
There are a myriad of ways in which unification, or at least centralized administrative 
control, can be divided with respect to efficiency or performance measurement. Lussier (2011) 
offers up four resource types: human, financial, physical, and informational. Harrsion and St. 
John (2009) divide these as human, physical, financial, knowledge and learning, and general 
organizational. Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert, & Verschuer (2004) in their conceptual review of 
organizational autonomy and centralization divided these into mangerial, policy, structural, 
financial, legal, and interventional. State Court Organization, a “joint effort of [the] Conference 
of State Court Adminstrators and [the] National Center for State Courts” since 1980 has offered 
the indicies approach with repsect to state courts in particular. The measures themselves vary, 
but they all consistenly demonstrate that “unification” is a far more nuanced concept, and 
measurement, that a single constitutional declaration would suggest. Nor does this necessarily 
mean an utter affirmation in favor of the 31 items selected for the purposes of this study, 
however this method has the marked benefit over others to rely on a variety of measures and 
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thereby (assuming no intercollinaraity) to give a better understanding of where state court 
systems stand in comparison to one another. 
Ramifications of "bragency" 
A broader question arises in what Raftery (2013) described as bragency: a state's 
judiciary stands alone in being expected to function simultaneously as a single branch and a 
single agency throughout a state and having the authority to achieve neither. No state adopted the 
entirety of “unification” as originally envisioned with the establishment of a single court made 
up divisions with interchangeable judges and a quasi-governor sitting atop. None went to far as 
to create a system of judge-employees who would be hired and fired by the chief justice; in terms 
of clerical staff some states moved closer to this ideal than others. Judiciaries at the state level 
are on occasion seen and organized as branches; they often have their own IT systems, separate 
support services and agencies, separate appropriations line items. But looking closer one finds 
individual districts, counties, even courts in states that are constitutionally defined as “unified” 
effectively outside the control of the centralized state authority (chief justice/supreme 
court/judicial council). In dealing with the prospect of a “unified” Europe in the 1970s Henry 
Kissinger reportedly quipped “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” Kissinger has in recent 
years denied making the exact comment (Gera, 2012), but the underlying premise remains that 
courts in many states remain a multitude of individual actors and entities often in direction 
contravention to the “unified” language in law. 
From a policy perspective this often means that local courts are not fully acknowledged 
as being a separate branch of government, but are instead looked upon as mere agencies of local 
government under the command and control of the other two branches. At worst this results in 
pressures for courts to operate like other agencies, particularly in terms of generation of revenue. 
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The Conference of State Court Administrators (2012) warned that courts are not revenue centers. 
The US. Department of Justice in its report on the situation in Ferguson, Missouri noted that the 
local municipal court was housed in and staffed by the local police; even the court's clerk was 
part-time police employee. (United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2015) 
The state of Missouri itself was unable to give a specific number of municipal courts in the state; 
there was no obligation on the part of localities to report the existence of a municipal court to the 
state's supreme court or state court administrators office. A new law adopted in 2015 now 
requires all courts report their existence to the Clerk of the Supreme Court (Mo. Rev. Stat. §. 
479.155). 
Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: The need to re-examine unification 
An important conclusion to be drawn from this study is that unification may matter in 
terms of efficiency and that the effective abandonment of looking at overall state court 
organization and structure in favor of focusing on individual court performance in this regard 
was an error. There was some logic to its abandonment in the 1970s. There was no data to 
support what had to the point been a tenant of faith in some corners of the legal reform 
community that unified meant better and faster disposition. The concept had lain too long in law 
journals, judges, and lawyers and had never been empirically challenged. The offered solution to 
drop it as a focus of research, or to instead focus on the fiscal/financial benefits of unification, 
was misplaced. 
Just as misplaced was the notion by legal reformers that unification was a panacea for all 
woes affecting the courts. As with any endeavor there are tradeoffs. There appear to be benefits 
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to overall clearances rates in placing in the hands of a centralized state-level authority the 
decision to where to put judges (temporarily or permanently), but these are potentially 
overweighed by other elements of unification, or factors not even included within the confines of 
this particular study. Judges are not merely employees and cases cannot simply be disposed of in 
an assembly line fashion within a legal and social context that values judges as arbiters and law 
and courts are the mechanism by which society seeks to right wrongs in a peaceful context. 
Perhaps then there is a better way to formulate the question of unification and that is 
abandon the term outside of some limiter. 
 Managerial unification, for example, in states where the centralized authority can 
allocate or temporarily transfer judgeships. 
 Technological unification in states with a single centralized IT infrastructure. 
 Budgetary unification in states where the centralized authority prepares and 
executes the budget for every court in the state, regardless of whether the actual 
funds come from the state or local government 
 Funding or appropriations unification where the state pays for 100% of all court 
operations and activities. 
 Unified judicial education program where the state’s central authority establishes 
not only the standards but administers the education and training for judges and 
non-judicial staff. 
Recommendation 2: Stop "Courting Ignorance"- the need for data 
A second more basic question is the need for data in the area of courts. As noted for over 
a century a basic tenant for unification has been for the collection of comparable data regarding 
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the processing of cases in a state. Since the 1970s the National Center for State Courts has been 
the “de facto national archive of state court caseload information” using first the State Court 
Model Statistical Dictionary from 1980 to 2003 and more recently the State Court Guide to 
Statistical Reporting to allow for cross-state comparisons. However, there are challenges starting 
at the basic court level itself. As noted above, 26 states were unable to identify the total number 
of cases filed and disposed in all their courts in the period selected. In many cases the reason was 
that the lower, smaller, locally controlled courts did not, could not, or would not report that 
information at all to the centralized state authority (state court adminsitrators office). In many 
instances the reason was that the court itself simply did not collect that information to even be 
able to send to the central authority in the first place. In others the data was avialable for some 
counties or some lower court types, but not others. Early advocates for court reform such as W.F. 
Willoughby in his book Principles of Judicial Administration (1929) advocating unification and 
the American Judiciature Society (1930) both made reference to state courts as the “dark 
continent” through which the light of statistics and data never passed. 
Today is no different in many respects that conditions in 1929/1930. Stephen Yeazell 
(2014) notes that as far as research is concerned, “we know so little about out most important 
courts” simply becaue no one is looking beyond the local level. 
As a result of these circumstances, the data from which long-term studies of the state trial 
judiciaries might be constructed lies moldering in the basements of three thousand county 
courthouses, unless it has been destroyed by floods, eaten by vermin, or discarded to 
make space for newer records or an air-conditioning system. While state governments 
might have an abstract interest in how the state courts were performing, that interest was 
until recent decades not sharpened by having to pick up the tab for an unusually 
incompetent or expensive set of judges. The costs, both financial and governmental were 
borne locally, and the records, if any, went no further than the local unit of government. 
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 More advanced concepts, such as computing average time to disposition rates for judges, 
courts, or states, are effectively impossible as a result. Where it is collected, it is rarely released 
to the public at the aggregate level, much less at the judge level. Moreover, there is an 
insitituional aversion to such efforts from the judiciary. When the Michigan’s State Court 
Administrative Office (SCAO) in 2012 moved towards such performance measures and 
suggested that the information could possible be released to the public in the futurte, several 
judges in the state refused to comply with data reporting requirements. An SCAO spokesperson 
put it simply: “When you hear a number of judges say 'performance measures in courts,' they 
think the terms don't belong in the same breath.” (Roose-Church, 2012) 
Future Research 
There are a number of areas suggested by this study for future research using the data set 
collected or with supplemental data points:  
 Case type differentials:  Henderson, et al. (1984) suggested that unification could 
be more benefitial to the efficient disposition of certain case types over others. 
They divided the caseload into civil and criminal; the data used in this research 
and collected by the National Center for State Courts divides this into five areas: 
civil, criminal, domestic relations, juvenile, and traffic/infraction/ordinance. 
 Disaggregation and case type: A combination of the above, but with an added 
focus on how individual elements relate. For example, centralized control over 
probation (criminal) should theoretically have no impact on efficiency in civil 
cases, but could impact efficiency in criminal dispositions. 
 Single Group Pretest/Posttest (Jackson, 2014): Four states have made major 
advances towards unification in the last 15 years: California (2000), Arkansas 
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(2000 with implementation over the last decade), Vermont (2010), and New 
Hampshire (2011). Although it would lack external validity, examining the level 
of efficiency before unification and after in each would provide some degree of 
information on impact. 
 Nonequivalent Control Group Pretest/Posttest (Jackson, 2014): Similar to the 
above, but with “control” states used that did not undergo unification before, 
during, or after the time periods in question. Because they would be purposefully 
selected and nonrandom, they would not be precise equivalents 
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Appendix A Complete T-Test Results: 24 selected states vs. 25 not-selected 
states on independent variables 
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Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
Std. 
Error 
Differe
nce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
NumberOfTri
alCourts 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.965 .331 -.860 47 .394 -.508 .591 -1.697 .680 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.861 46.997 .394 -.508 .591 -1.696 .680 
Appointment 
of Sitting 
Judges 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.042 .839 -.289 47 .774 -.062 .213 -.491 .368 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.289 46.972 .774 -.062 .213 -.490 .367 
Appointment 
of 
Supplemental 
Judges 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.049 .826 -.315 47 .754 -.075 .238 -.554 .404 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.315 46.686 .754 -.075 .238 -.554 .404 
Court 
Annexed ADR 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.005 .944 .212 47 .833 .047 .220 -.397 .490 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.212 46.988 .833 .047 .220 -.397 .490 
Collection of 
Legal 
Financial 
Obligations 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.001 .972 .501 47 .618 .095 .189 -.286 .476 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.502 46.999 .618 .095 .189 -.286 .476 
Data 
Processing 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.386 .538 -.883 47 .382 -.168 .191 -.552 .215 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.887 45.554 .380 -.168 .190 -.550 .214 
Records 
Management 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.087 .769 .550 47 .585 .077 .139 -.204 .357 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.549 46.486 .586 .077 .140 -.204 .358 
Emergency 
Management 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.601 .037 -.205 47 .839 -.037 .179 -.397 .324 
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Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.206 42.863 .838 -.037 .178 -.395 .322 
Facilities 
Management 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.229 .634 1.281 47 .206 .210 .164 -.120 .540 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.285 46.562 .205 .210 .163 -.119 .539 
Facilities 
Security 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.017 .896 .960 47 .342 .167 .174 -.182 .516 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.963 46.609 .341 .167 .173 -.182 .515 
Accounting Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.692 .061 1.479 47 .146 .232 .157 -.083 .547 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.483 46.590 .145 .232 .156 -.083 .546 
Audits Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.847 .362 -.630 47 .531 -.125 .198 -.524 .274 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.633 45.578 .530 -.125 .197 -.522 .272 
Budget 
Preparation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.279 .600 1.349 47 .184 .230 .171 -.113 .573 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.348 46.712 .184 .230 .171 -.113 .573 
Purchasing Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.238 .016 1.315 47 .195 .235 .179 -.125 .595 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.322 44.845 .193 .235 .178 -.123 .593 
Human 
Resources 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.040 .842 .172 47 .864 .030 .175 -.321 .381 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.172 46.951 .864 .030 .175 -.321 .381 
Information 
Technology 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.463 .500 .649 47 .519 .102 .157 -.213 .417 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.651 46.590 .518 .102 .156 -.213 .416 
Judicial 
Education 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.784 .188 .531 47 .598 .098 .185 -.274 .471 
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Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.529 43.725 .600 .098 .186 -.277 .473 
Judicial 
Performance 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.078 .781 -.095 47 .925 -.022 .229 -.482 .439 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.095 46.992 .925 -.022 .229 -.482 .439 
General 
Counsel 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.043 .837 .693 47 .492 .167 .241 -.317 .651 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.693 46.986 .491 .167 .240 -.317 .650 
Other Legal 
Services 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.603 .212 1.240 47 .221 .290 .234 -.180 .760 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.245 46.047 .219 .290 .233 -.179 .759 
Law Library 
Staff 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.000 .985 1.385 47 .173 .333 .241 -.151 .817 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.387 46.986 .172 .333 .240 -.150 .817 
Legal 
Research Staff 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.316 .577 1.242 47 .220 .255 .205 -.158 .668 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.242 46.979 .220 .255 .205 -.158 .668 
Liaison to 
Legislature 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.423 .239 1.183 47 .243 .183 .155 -.129 .495 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.179 45.286 .245 .183 .156 -.130 .497 
Liaison to 
Ombudsman 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
10.996 .002 -1.551 47 .128 -.258 .167 -.593 .077 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.535 36.061 .134 -.258 .168 -.600 .083 
Liaison to 
Public 
Information 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.451 .040 -.340 47 .735 -.055 .162 -.380 .270 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.338 42.203 .737 -.055 .163 -.383 .273 
Foster Care 
Review 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.167 .148 -.761 47 .451 -.142 .186 -.516 .233 
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Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.757 44.038 .453 -.142 .187 -.519 .235 
Adult 
Probation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.762 .103 .918 47 .363 .152 .165 -.181 .484 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.922 45.509 .361 .152 .165 -.180 .483 
Juvenile 
Probation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.473 .231 .702 47 .486 .143 .204 -.267 .554 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.704 46.350 .485 .143 .204 -.266 .553 
Performance 
Measurement 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.818 .370 -.427 47 .671 -.088 .207 -.504 .328 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.429 46.235 .670 -.088 .206 -.503 .326 
Court 
Statistics 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.240 .627 1.183 47 .243 .183 .155 -.129 .495 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.186 46.584 .242 .183 .155 -.128 .494 
Research/Plan
ning 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.959 .332 .693 47 .492 .100 .144 -.190 .390 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.692 46.814 .492 .100 .144 -.191 .391 
Technical 
Assistance to 
Courts 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.788 .379 .914 47 .365 .137 .150 -.164 .438 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.915 46.955 .365 .137 .149 -.164 .437 
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Group Statistics 
 INCLUDE N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
NumberOfTrialCourts Included States 24 3.29 2.032 .415 
Excluded States 25 3.80 2.102 .420 
Appointment of Sitting 
Judges 
Included States 24 2.46 .721 .147 
Excluded States 25 2.52 .770 .154 
Appointment of 
Supplemental Judges 
Included States 24 2.13 .850 .174 
Excluded States 25 2.20 .816 .163 
Court Annexed ADR Included States 24 2.17 .761 .155 
Excluded States 25 2.12 .781 .156 
Collection of Legal 
Financial Obligations 
Included States 24 2.38 .647 .132 
Excluded States 25 2.28 .678 .136 
Data Processing Included States 24 1.79 .588 .120 
Excluded States 25 1.96 .735 .147 
Records Management Included States 24 1.92 .504 .103 
Excluded States 25 1.84 .473 .095 
Emergency Management Included States 24 2.08 .504 .103 
Excluded States 25 2.12 .726 .145 
Facilities Management Included States 24 2.25 .532 .109 
Excluded States 25 2.04 .611 .122 
Facilities Security Included States 24 2.17 .565 .115 
Excluded States 25 2.00 .645 .129 
Accounting Included States 24 1.79 .509 .104 
Excluded States 25 1.56 .583 .117 
Audits Included States 24 1.88 .612 .125 
Excluded States 25 2.00 .764 .153 
Budget Preparation Included States 24 1.75 .608 .124 
Excluded States 25 1.52 .586 .117 
Purchasing Included States 24 1.88 .537 .110 
Excluded States 25 1.64 .700 .140 
Human Resources Included States 24 1.75 .608 .124 
Excluded States 25 1.72 .614 .123 
Information Technology Included States 24 1.54 .509 .104 
Excluded States 25 1.44 .583 .117 
Judicial Education Included States 24 1.46 .721 .147 
Excluded States 25 1.36 .569 .114 
Judicial Performance Included States 24 2.46 .779 .159 
Excluded States 25 2.48 .823 .165 
General Counsel Included States 24 2.17 .816 .167 
Excluded States 25 2.00 .866 .173 
Other Legal Services Included States 24 2.25 .737 .150 
Excluded States 25 1.96 .889 .178 
Law Library Staff Included States 24 2.33 .816 .167 
Excluded States 25 2.00 .866 .173 
Legal Research Staff Included States 24 2.38 .711 .145 
Excluded States 25 2.12 .726 .145 
Liaison to Legislature Included States 24 1.58 .584 .119 
Excluded States 25 1.40 .500 .100 
Liaison to Ombudsman Included States 24 2.54 .721 .147 
Excluded States 25 2.80 .408 .082 
Included States 24 1.63 .647 .132 
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Liaison to Public 
Information 
Excluded States 25 1.68 .476 .095 
Foster Care Review Included States 24 2.46 .721 .147 
Excluded States 25 2.60 .577 .115 
Adult Probation Included States 24 2.79 .509 .104 
Excluded States 25 2.64 .638 .128 
Juvenile Probation Included States 24 2.58 .654 .133 
Excluded States 25 2.44 .768 .154 
Performance Measurement Included States 24 1.79 .658 .134 
Excluded States 25 1.88 .781 .156 
Court Statistics Included States 24 1.58 .504 .103 
Excluded States 25 1.40 .577 .115 
Research/Planning Included States 24 1.50 .511 .104 
Excluded States 25 1.40 .500 .100 
Technical Assistance to 
Courts 
Included States 24 1.42 .504 .103 
Excluded States 25 1.28 .542 .108 
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